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Abstract: This paper explores the question of whether market participants could have or should have 
anticipated the large increase in foreclosures that occurred in 2007 and 2008. Most of these foreclosures 
stemmed from loans originated in 2005 and 2006, leading many to suspect that lenders originated a large 
volume of extremely risky loans during this period. However, the authors show that while loans originated 
in this period did carry extra risk factors, particularly increased leverage, underwriting standards alone 
cannot explain the dramatic rise in foreclosures. Focusing on the role of house prices, the authors ask 
whether market participants underestimated the likelihood of a fall in house prices or the sensitivity of 
foreclosures to house prices. The authors show that, given available data, market participants should have 
been able to understand that a significant fall in prices would cause a large increase in foreclosures 
although loan-level (as opposed to ownership-level) models would have predicted a smaller rise than 
actually occurred. Examining analyst reports and other contemporary discussions of the mortgage market 
to see what market participants thought would happen, the authors find that analysts, on the whole, 
understood that a fall in prices would have disastrous consequences for the market but assigned a low 
probability to such an outcome. 
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Had market participants anticipated the increase in defaults on subprime mortgages
originated in 2005 and 2006, the nature and extent of the current ﬁnancial market dis-
ruptions would be very different. Ex ante, investors in subprime mortgage-backed
securities would have demanded higher returns and greater capital cushions. As a re-
sult, borrowers would not have found credit as cheap or as easy to obtain as it became
during the subprime credit boom of 2005–2006. Rating agencies would have had a
similar reaction, rating a much smaller fraction of each deal investment grade. Ex post,
the increasein foreclosureswouldhavebeen signiﬁcantlysmaller, with fewer attendant
disruptions to the housing market. In addition, investors would not have suffered such
outsized, and unexpected, losses. To make sense of the subprime crisis, one needs to
understand why, when accepting signiﬁcant exposure to the creditworthiness of sub-
prime borrowers, so many smart analysts, armed with advanced degrees, data on the
past performanceof subprime borrowers, and state-of-the-artmodeling technology did
not anticipate that so many of the loans they were buying, either directly or indirectly,
would go bad.
Our bottomline is that the problemlargely had to do with house price expectations.
Had investors knownthe trajectoryof house prices, they would have predictedlarge in-
creases in delinquency and default and losses on subprime mortgage-backedsecurities
(MBS) roughly consistent with what we have seen. We show this by using two differ-
ent methodsto travel back to 2005,whensubprimewas still thriving,and lookforward.
The ﬁrst method is to forecast performance with only data available in 2005 and the
second is to look at what market participants wrote at the time. The latter “narrative”
analysis, which appears in Section 4 below, provides strong evidence against the claim
that investors lost money by purchasing loans which, because they were originated by
others, could not be evaluated properly.
We proceed by ﬁrst addressing the question of whether the loans themselves were
ex ante unreasonable. Loans made in 2005–2006 were not that different from loans
made earlier, which, in turn had performed well, despite carrying a variety of serious
risk factors. We show that lenders did make riskier loans, and describe in detail the
dimensions along which risk increased. In particular, we ﬁnd that borrower leverage
increasedand, further,didso in a waythat was relativelyopaqueto investors. However,
2we ﬁnd that the change in the mix of mortgages originated is too mild to explain the
huge increase in defaults. Put simply, the average default rate on loans originated in
2006 exceeds the default rate on the riskiest category of loans originated in 2004.
We then focus on the collapse in house price appreciation (HPA) that started in the
spring of 2006.1 Lenders must either have expected that HPA would remain high (or
at least that house prices would not collapse), or have expected subprime defaults to
be insensitive to a big drop in house prices. More formally, if we let f represent fore-
closures, p represent prices, and t represent time, then we can decompose the growth
in foreclosures over time, df/dt, into a part correspondingto the change in prices over
time and a part reﬂecting the sensitivity of foreclosures to prices:
df/dt = df/dp × dp/dt.
Our goal is to determine whether market participants underestimated df/dp, the sensi-
tivity of foreclosures to prices, or whether dp/dt, the trajectory of house prices, came
out much worse than they expected.
We begin with data that were available, ex ante, on mortgage performance to de-
termine whether it was possible to estimate df/dp on subprime mortgages accurately.
Because severe house price declines are relatively rare and the subprime market is rel-
atively new, one plausible theory is that the data did not contain sufﬁcient variation to
estimate df/dp in scenarios in which dp/dt is negative and large. We put ourselves
in the place of analysts in 2005, using data through 2004 to estimate the type of haz-
ard models commonly used in the industry to predict mortgage defaults. We use two
datasets. The ﬁrst is a loan-level dataset from First American LoanPerfomance that
is used extensively in the industry to track the performance of mortgages in MBS;
this dataset has sparse information on loans originated before 1999. The second is an
ownership-level dataset from the Warren Group, which tracked the fates of homebuy-
ers in Massachusetts from the late 1980s forward. These data were not (so far as we
can tell) widely used by industry but were, at least in theory, available. The Warren
Group data do contain information on the behavior of homeowners in an environment
of falling prices.
We ﬁnd that it was possible, althoughnot easy, to measure df/dp with some degree
1Examples include Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007), Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2008), Demyanyk
and van Hemert (2007), Doms, Furlong, and Krainer (2007), and Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005).
3of accuracy. Essentially, a researcher with perfect foresight about the trajectory of
prices from 2005 forward would have forecast a large increase in foreclosures starting
in 2007. Perhaps the most interesting result is that, despite the absence of negative
HPA in 1998–2004, when almost all subprime loans were originated, we could still
determine, albeit not exactly, the behavior of subprime borrowers in a falling house
price environment. In effect, the out-of-sample (and out-of-support) performance of
default models was sufﬁciently good to have predicted large losses in a falling house
price environment.
However, while it was possible to estimate df/dp, we also ﬁnd that the relationship
was less exact when using data on loans rather than data on ownerships. A given
borrower might reﬁnance his original loan several times before defaulting. All of the
loans bar the ﬁnal one would have been seen as successful by lenders. An ownership
spans multiple loans and terminates only when the homeowner sells and moves or is
foreclosed upon and evicted. Thus, while the same foreclosure would appear as a
default in both loan-level and ownership-level data, intermediate reﬁnancings between
purchase and foreclosure would not appear as happy endings in an ownership-level
database.
In the last section of the paper, we discuss what analysts of the mortgage market
said in 2004, 2005, and 2006 about the loans that eventually got into trouble. Our
conclusion is that investment analysts had a good sense of df/dp and understood, with
remarkable accuracy, how falling dp/dt would affect the performance of subprime
mortgages and the securities backed by them. As an illustrative example, consider a
2005 analyst report published by a large investment bank: it analyzed a representative
deal composed of 2005 vintage loans and argued it would face 17 percent cumulative
losses in a “meltdown”scenario in which house prices fell 5 percent over the life of the
deal. Their analysis is prescient: the ABX index (an index that represents a basket of
credit default swaps on high-risk mortgages and home equity loans) currently implies
that such a deal will actually face losses of 18.3 percent over its life. The problem was
that the report only assigned a 5 percent probability to the meltdown scenario, whereas
it assigned a 15 percent probability and a 50 percent probability to scenarios in which
house prices grew 11 percent and 5 percent, respectively, over the life of the deal.
We argue that house prices outweigh other changes in driving up foreclosures.
However, we do not take a position on why prices rose so rapidly, fell so fast, and
4why they peaked in mid-2006. Other researchers have examined whether factors such
as lending standards can affect house prices.2 Broadly speaking, we maintain the
assumption that while, in the aggregate, lending standards may indeed have affected
house price dynamics (we are agnostic on this point), no individual market participant
felt that he could affect prices with his actions. Nor do we analyze whether the housing
market was overvalued in 2005 and 2006, and whether a collapse of house prices was
therefore, to some extent, predictable. There was a lively debate during that period,
with some arguing that housing was reasonably valued (see Himmelberg, Mayer, and
Sinai 2005 and McCarthy and Peach 2004) and others arguing that it was overvalued
(see Gallin 2006, Gallin 2008, and Davis, Lehnert, and Martin 2008).
Our results in Sections 2 and 3 suggest that some borrowers were more sensitive
than others to a single macro risk factor (here: house prices). This comports well with
the ﬁndings of Musto and Souleles (2006), who argue that average default rates are
only half the story; they argue that correlations across borrowers, perhaps driven by
macro factors, are also an important factor in valuing portfolios of consumer loans.
In this paper, we focus almost exclusively on subprime mortgages. However, many
of the same arguments might apply to prime mortgages. Lucas and McDonald (2006)
computed the volatility of the underlying assets of the housing-related government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), which concentrate mainly on prime and near-prime
mortgages,using information on the ﬁrms’ leverage and their stock prices. They found
that risk was quitehigh (and, as a result, the value of the implicit governmentguarantee
on GSE debt was also quite high).
Many have argued that a major driver of the subprime crisis was the increased use
of securitization.3 In this view, the “originate to distribute” business model of many
mortgageﬁnance companies separated the underwriter making the credit extension de-
cision from exposure to the ultimate credit quality of the borrower and thus created an
incentive to maximize lending volume without concern for default rates. In addition,
information asymmetries, unfamiliarity with the market, or other factors prevented in-
vestorswhowerebuyingthecreditriskfromputtinginplaceeffectivecontrolsforthese
incentives. While this argument is intuitively persuasive, our results are not consistent
2Examples of this include Pavlov and Wachter (2006), Coleman IV, Lacour-Little, and Vandell (2008),
Wheaton and Lee (2008), Wheaton and Nechayev (2008), and Sanders, Chomsisengphet, Agarwal, and
Ambrose (2008).
3See, for example, Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2008) and Calomiris (2008).
5with such an explanation. One of our key ﬁndings is that most of the uncertainty about
losses stemmed from uncertainty about the evolution of house prices and not from
uncertainty about the quality of the underwriting. All that said, our models do not per-
fectly predict the defaults that occurred, and these often underestimate the number of
defaults. One possible explanation is that there was an unobservable deterioration of
underwritingstandards in 2005 and 2006.4 But another possible explanation is that our
modelof the highlynon-linearrelationshipbetween prices and foreclosuresis wanting.
No existing research successfully separates the two explanations.
The endogeneity of prices does present a problem for our estimation. One com-
mon theory is that foreclosures drive price falls by increasing the supply of homes for
sale, in effect introducing a new term into the decomposition of df/dt, namely, dp/df.
However, our estimation techniques are, to a large extent, robust to this issue.5 In fact,
as we show in Section 3, it is possible to estimate the effect of house prices on fore-
closures even in periods when there were very few foreclosures, and when foreclosed
properties sold quickly.
No discussion of the subprimecrisis of 2007and2008is completewithout mention
of the interest rate resets built into many subprime mortgages that virtually guaranteed
large payment increases. Many commentators have attributed the crisis to the payment
shock associated with the ﬁrst reset of subprime 2/28 mortgages. However, the evi-
dence from loan-level data shows that resets cannot account for a signiﬁcant portion of
the increase in foreclosures. Both Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2008) and Foote, Ger-
ardi, Goette, and Willen (2007) show that the overwhelming majority of defaults on
subprime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) occur long before the ﬁrst reset. In other
words, many lenders would have been lucky had borrowers waited until the ﬁrst reset
to default.
The rest of the paper is organizedas follows. In Section 2, we documentchangesin
underwriting standards on mortgages. In Section 3 we explore what researchers could
have learned with the data they had in 2005. We review contemporary analyst reports
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
4An explanation favored by Demyanyk and van Hemert (2007).
5As discussed in Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007), most of the variation in the key explanatory
variable, homeowner’s equity, is within-town (MSA), within-quarter variation, and thus could not be driven
by differences in foreclosures over time or across towns (MSAs)
62 Underwriting Standards in the Subprime Market
In this section, we beginwith a briefbackgroundon subprimemortgages,includingthe
competing deﬁnitions of “subprime.”6 We then turn to a discussion of changes in the
apparent credit risk of subprime mortgages originated from 1999 to 2007, and we link
these to the actual performance of the underlying loans. We argue that the increased
number of subprime loans originated with high loan-to-value rations (LTV) was the
most important observable risk factor that increased over the period. Further, we argue
that the increases in leverage were to some extent masked from investors in mortgage-
backed securities. Loans originated with less than complete documentation of income
or assets, and particularly those originated with both high leverage and incomplete
documentation, exhibited sharper rises in defaults than other loans. A more formal
decomposition exercise, however, conﬁrms that the rise in defaults can be only partly
explained by observed changes in underwriting standards.
2.1 Background on subprime mortgages
Oneofthe ﬁrst notablefeaturesencounteredbyresearchersworkingonsubprimemort-
gagesis thedensethicket ofjargonsurroundingtheﬁeld, particularlythe multiplecom-
peting deﬁnitions of “subprime.” This hampers attempts to estimate the importance of
subprime lending.
There are, effectively, four useful ways to categorize a loan as subprime. First,
mortgage servicers themselves recognize that certain borrowers require more frequent
contact in order to ensure timely payment; they charge higher fees to service these
loans. Second, some lenders specialize in loans to ﬁnancially troubled borrowers. The
DepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopmentmaintainsalist ofsuchlenders. Loans
originated by these so-called “HUD list” lenders are often taken as a proxy for sub-
prime loans. Third, “high cost” loans are deﬁned as loans that carry fees and rates
signiﬁcantly above those charged to typical borrowers. Fourth, the loan may be sold
into an asset-backed security marketed as containing subprime mortgages.
Table 1 providestwo measures of the importanceof subprimelendingin the United
States. The ﬁrst column shows the percent of loans in the Mortgage Bankers Associ-
ation (MBA) delinquency survey that are classiﬁed as “subprime.” Because the MBA
6For a more detailed discussion, see Mayer and Pence (2008).
7surveysmortgageservicers,thiscolumnrepresentstheservicerdeﬁnitionofasubprime
loan. As shown, overthe past few years, subprime mortgageshave accountedfor about
12 to 14 percentage of outstanding mortgages. The second and third columns show the
percent of loans tracked under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act that are classiﬁed
as “high cost.” As shown, in 2005 and 2006 roughly 25 percent of originations were
subprime under this deﬁnition.7
These two measures point to an important discrepancy between the stock and the
ﬂowofsubprimemortgages(althoughsourcedataanddeﬁnitionsalsoaccountforsome
of the difference). Subprime mortgages were a growing part of the U.S. mortgage
market, so that the ﬂow of new mortgages should naturally exceed their presence in
the stock of outstanding mortgages. In addition, subprime mortgages, for a variety
of reasons, tend to last for a shorter period of time than prime mortgages, so they
form a larger share of the ﬂow of new mortgages than of the stock of outstanding
mortgages. Furthermore, until the mid-2000s most subprime mortgages were typically
used to reﬁnancean existing loan and, simultaneously,to increase the principalbalance
(allowingthe homeownerto borrowagainst accumulatedequity), rather than to ﬁnance
the purchase of a home.
In this section we focus on changes in the kinds of loans made over the period
1999 to 2007. We use loan-level data on mortgages sold into private-label mortgage-
backed securities marketed as subprime. These data are provided by First American
LoanPerformance and were widely used in the ﬁnancial services industry. We further
limit the set of loans to the three most popular products: those carrying ﬁxed interest
rates to maturity, and so-called “2/28s” and “3/27s.” A 2/28 is a mortgagein which the
contract rate is ﬁxed at an initial “teaser” rate for two years, after which it adjusts to the
six-month Libor rate plus a predetermined margin (often around 6 percentage points).
A “3/27” is similar.8 We refer to this database as “the ABS data” for simplicity.
In this section, the outcome variable of interest is whether a mortgage defaults
within 12 months of its ﬁrst payment due date. There are several competingdeﬁnitions
of “default”; here, we deﬁne a mortgage as having defaulted by month 12 if, as of
7HMDA data are taken from Federal Reserve Bulletin articles; see Avery, Canner, and Cook (2005),
Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2006), Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2007), and Avery, Brevoort, and Canner
(2008). Note that the high-cost measure was only introduced to the HMDA data in 2004; for operational and
technical reasons, the reported share of high cost loans in 2004 may be depressed relative to its share in later
years.
8These three loan categories accounted for more than 98 percent of loans in the original data.
8its twelfth month of life, it had terminated following a foreclosure notice; if the loan
was listed as real estate owned by the servicer (indicating a transfer of title from the
borrower); if the loan was still active but foreclosure proceedings had been initiated;
or if the loan was 90 or more days past due. Note that some of the loans we count
as defaults might subsequently revert to current status if the borrower made up missed
payments. In effect, any borrower who manages to make 10 of the ﬁrst 12 mortgage
payments or who reﬁnances or sells without a formal notice of default having been
ﬁled is assumed not to have defaulted.
The default rate is shown in Figure 1. Conceptually, default rates differ from delin-
quency rates in that they track the fate of mortgages originated in a given month by
their twelfth month of life; in effect, the default rate tracks the proportion of mort-
gages originated at a given point that are “dead” by month 12. Delinquency rates, by
contrast, track the proportion of all active mortgages that are “sick” at a given point
in calendar time. Further, because we close our dataset in December 2007, we can
track only the fate of mortgages originated through Deccember 2006. The continued
steep increase in mortgage distress is not reﬂected in our data here, nor is the fate of
mortgages originated in 2007, although we do track the underwriting characteristics of
these mortgages.
Note that this measure of default is designed to allow us to compare the ex ante
credit risk of various underwriting terms. It is of limited usefulness as a predictor of
defaults because it considers only what happens by the twelfth month of life and does
not consider the changing house price, interest rate, and overall economic environment
faced by households. Further, this measure does not consider the changing incentives
to reﬁnance. The competing risk, duration models we estimate in Section 3 are, for
these reasons, far better suited to determining the credit and prepayment outlook for a
group of mortgages.
2.2 Changes in underwriting standards
During the credit boom, lenders published daily “rate sheets” with various combina-
tions of loan risk characteristics and the associated interest rates they would charge to
make such loans. A simple rate sheet, for example, might be a matrix of credit scores
and loan-to-value ratios; borrowers with lower credit scores or higher LTVs would be
9charged higher interest rates or be forced to pay larger fees up front. Certain cells of
the matrix such as combinations of low score and high LTV, might not be available at
all.
Unfortunately,we do not have access to information on the evolution of rate sheets
over time, but underwriting standards can change in ways observable in the ABS data.
Of course, underwritingstandards can also change in ways observable to the loan orig-
inator but not reﬂected in the ABS data, or in ways largely unobservable by even the
loan originator (for example, an increase in the number of borrowers getting home
equity lines of credit (HELOCs) after origination). In this section, we consider the ev-
idence that more loans with ex ante, observable risky characteristics were originated.
Throughout,we use loans from the ABS database described earlier.
We consider trends over time in borrower credit scores, loan documentation,lever-
age (as measured by the combined loan-to-value ratio or CLTV at origination), and
other factors associated with risk, such as a loan’s purpose, non-owner occupancy, and
amortizationschedules. We ﬁnd that, from1999to2007,borrowerleverage,loanswith
incomplete documentation, loans used to purchase homes (as opposed to reﬁnance an
existing loan), and loans with non-traditional amortization schedules grew. Borrower
credit scores increased while loans to non-occupant owners remained essentially ﬂat.
Of these, the increase in borrower leverage appears to have contributed the most to the
increase in defaults, and we ﬁnd some evidence that leverage was, in the ABS data at
least, opaque.
Credit Scores Credit scores, which essentially summarize a borrower’s history of
missing debt payments, are the most obvious deﬁnition of “subprime.” The commonly
used scalar credit score is the FICO score originally developed by Fair, Isaac & Co.
It is the only score contained in the ABS data, although subprime lenders often used
scores and other information from all three credit reporting bureaus.
Under widely accepted industry rules of thumb, borrowers with FICO scores of
680 or above are not usually considered subprime without another accompanying risk
factor; borrowerswith credit scores between620and 680may be consideredsubprime,
while those with credit scores below 620 are rarely eligible for prime loans. Note that
subprime pricing models typically used more information than just a borrower’s credit
score; they also considered the nature of the missed payment that led a borrower to
10have a low credit score. For example, a pricing system might assign greater weight to
missed mortgage payments than to missed credit card payments.
Figure 2 shows the proportionof newly originated subprime loans falling into each
of these three categories. As shown, loans to borrowers with FICO scores of 680 and
above grew over the sample period, while loans to traditionally subprime borrowers
(those with scores below 620) accounted for a smaller share of originations.
Loan Documentation Borrowers (or their mortgage brokers) submit a ﬁle with each
mortgage application documenting the borrower’s income, liquid assets, other debts,
and the value of the property being used as collateral. Media attention has focused on
the rise of so-called “low doc” or “no doc” loans, which contained incomplete docu-
mentation of income or assets. (These are the infamous “stated income” loans.) The
top left panel of Figure 3 shows the proportion of newly originated subprime loans
carrying less than full documentation. As shown, this proportion rose from around 20
percent in 1999 to a high of more than 35 percent by mid-2006. While reduced doc
lendingwas a partofsubprimelending,it was bynomeansthemajorityofthe business,
nor did it increase dramatically during the credit boom.
As we discuss in greaterdetail below, until about 2004,subprimeloans were gener-
ally backed by substantial equity in the property. This was especially true for subprime
loans with less than complete documentation. Thus, in some sense, the lender accepted
less complete documentation in exchange for a greater security interest in the underly-
ing property.
Leverage The leverage of a property is, in principle, the total value of all liens di-
vided by the mark-to-market value of the property. This is often referred to as the
property’s combined loan-to-value ratio, or CLTV. Both the numerator and denomina-
tor of the CLTV will ﬂuctuate over a borrower’s tenure in the property: the borrower
can amortize the original loan, reﬁnance or take on junior liens, and the potential sale
price of the house will also, of course, change over time. However, all of these vari-
ables ought to be known at the time of a loan’s origination. The lender undertakes a
title search to check for the presence of other liens on the property and hires an ap-
praiser to conﬁrm either the price paid (when the loan is used to purchase a home) or
the potential sale price of the property (when the loan is used to reﬁnance an existing
11loan).
In practicalterms, highleveragewas also accompaniedbyadditionalcomplications
and opacity. Rather than originate a single loan for the desired amount, originators
often preferred to originate two loans: one for 80 percent of the property’s value, and
the other for the remaining desired loan balance. In the event of a default, the holder of
the ﬁrst lien would be paid ﬁrst from sale proceeds, with the junior lien holder getting
the remaining proceeds (if any). Lenders may have split loans in this way for the same
reason that asset-backed securities are tranched into a AAA-rated piece and a below
investment-grade piece. Some investors might specialize in credit risk evaluation and
hencepreferthe riskierpiece, whileotherinvestorsmightprefertoforgocreditanalysis
and purchase the less risky loan.
The reporting of these junior liens in the ABS data appears to be spotty. This could
be the case if, for example, the junior lien was originated by a different lender than
the ﬁrst lien, because the ﬁrst lien lender might not properly report the second lien,
while the second lien lender might not report the loan at all. If the junior lien was an
open-endedloan, such as a home equity line of credit (HELOC), it appears not to have
been reported in the ABS data at all, perhaps because the amount drawn was unknown
at origination.
Further, there is no comprehensive national system for tracking liens on any given
property. Thus, homeowners could take out a second lien shortly after purchasing or
reﬁnancing, raising their CLTV. While such borrowing should not affect the original
lender’s recovery, it does increase the probability of a default and thus the value of the
original loan.
The top right panel of Figure 3 shows the growth in the number of loans originated
with a high CLTV (deﬁned as CLTV≥ 90 percent or the presence of a junior lien);
in addition, the ﬁgure shows the proportion of loans originated for which a junior lien
was recorded.9 As shown, both measures of leveragerose sharplyover the past decade.
High CLTV lending accounts for roughly 10 percent of originations in 2000, rising to
over 50 percent by 2006. The incidence of junior liens also rose.
The presence of a junior lien has a powerful effect on the CLTV of the ﬁrst lien.
As shown in Table 2, loans without a second lien reported a CLTV of 79.9 percent,
9The ﬁgures shown here and elsewhere are based on ﬁrst liens only; where there is an associated junior
lien that information is used in computing CLTV and for other purposes, but the junior loan itself is not
counted.
12while those with a second lien reported a CLTV of 98.8 percent. Moreover, loans with
reported CLTVs of 90 percent or above were much likelier to have associated junior
liens, suggesting that lenders were leery of originating single mortgages with LTVs
greater than 90 percent.
Later, we will discuss the evidence that there was even more leveragethan reported
in the ABS data.
Other Risk Factors A variety of other loan and borrower characteristics may have
contributed to increased risk. The bottom left panel of Figure 3 shows the fraction of
loans originatedwith a non-traditionalamortizationschedule, to non-occupantowners,
and to borrowers who used the loan to purchase a property (as opposed to reﬁnancing
an existing loan).
A standard, or “traditional,” U.S. mortgage self-amortizes; that is, a portion of
each month’s payment is used to reduce the principal owed on the loan. As shown
in the bottom left panel of Figure 3, non-traditional amortization schedules became
increasingly popular among subprime loans. These were mainly loans that lowered
payments by not requiring sufﬁcient principal payments (at least in the early years of
the loan) to amortize over the 30-year term of the loan. Thus, some loans had interest-
onlyperiods,while others were amortizedover40 years, with a balloonpaymentdueat
the end of the 30-year term. The effect of these terms was to slightly lower payments,
especially in the early years of the loan.
Subprime loans had traditionally been used to reﬁnance an existing loan. As shown
in the bottom left panel of Figure 3, loans used to purchase homes also increased over
the period, although not dramatically. Loans to non-occupant owners, for example,
loans backed by a property held for investment purposes, are, all else equal, riskier
than loans to owner occupiers because the borrower can default and not face eviction
from his primary residence. As shown, such loans never accounted for a large fraction
of subprime originations, nor did they grow over the period.
Risk Layering As we discuss below, leverage is a key risk factor for subprime mort-
gages. An interesting question is the extent to which high leverage loans were com-
bined with other risk factors; this practice was sometimes known as risk layering. As
shown in the bottom right panel of Figure 3, risk layering grew over the sample period.
13Inparticular,loans with incompletedocumentationandhighleveragehadan especially
notable rise, increasing from essentially zero in 2001 to almost 20 percent of subprime
originationsbytheendof2006. Highlyleveragedloanstoborrowerspurchasinghomes
also increased over the period.
2.3 Effect on default rates
We now turn to consideringthe performanceof the variousrisk factors that we outlined
earlier. We start with simple univariate descriptions before turning to a more formal
decomposition exercise. Here, we continue to focus on 12-month default rates as our
outcome of interest. In the next section we present results from dynamic models that
consider the ability of borrowers to reﬁnance as well as default.
Documentation Level The upper left panel of Figure 4 shows the default rates over
time for loans with complete and incomplete documentation. As shown, the two loan
types performed roughly in line with one another until the current cycle, when default
rates on loans with incomplete documentation rose far more rapidly than default rates
on loans with complete documentation.
Leverage The top right panel of Figure 4 shows default rates on loans with high
CLTVs (deﬁned, again, as a CLTV≥ 90 or having a junior lien present at origination).
Again, loans with high leverage performedapproximatelyin line with other loans until
the most recent episode.
As we highlightedin the earlier discussion, leverage is often opaque. To dig deeper
into the correlation between leverage at origination and subsequent performance, we
estimated a pair of simple regressions relating CLTV at origination to default probabil-
ities and the initial contract interest rate chargedto the borrower. The results are shown
in Table 3. For all loans in the sample, we estimated a probit model of default and an
OLS model of the initial contract rate. The list of explanatory variables contained var-
ious measures of leverage, including an indicator variable for having a reported CLTV
in the dataset of exactly 80 percent, as well as a few other controls. We estimated two
versions of the simple model: model 1 simply contains the CLTV measures and the
initial contract rate itself; model 2 adds state and origination-date ﬁxed effects. These
results are designed purely to highlight the correlation among variables of interest and
14not as fully ﬂedged risk models. Model 1 can be thought of as the simple multivariate
correlation across the entire sample, while model 2 compares loans originated in the
same state at the same time. The results are shown in Figure 6. (When plotting the
expected default probability from model 2, we assume that the loan was originated in
California, in June 2005.)
As shown, default probabilities generally increase with increasing leverage. Note,
however,that loans with reported CLTVs of exactly 80 percent, which account for 15.7
percent of subprime loans, have substantially higher default probabilities than loans
with CLTVs of, for example, 79.9 percent or 80.01 percent. Indeed, under model 2,
whichincludestimeandstateﬁxedeffects,suchloansareamongtheriskiestoriginated.
As shown by the bottom panel of Figure 6, there is no compensating increase in the
initial contract rate charged to the borrower, although the lender may have charged
points and fees upfront (not measured in this dataset) to compensate for the increased
risk.
This evidence suggests that borrowers with apparently reasonable CLTVs were, in
fact, using junior liens to increase their leveragein a way not easily visible to investors,
nor apparently compensated by higher mortgage interest rates.
Other Risk Factors The bottom three panels of Figure 4 show the default rates asso-
ciatedwith thethreeotherrisk factorswe describedearlier: ownernon-occupancy,loan
purpose, and non-traditionalamortization schedules. As shown, loans to non-occupant
owners were not (in this sample) markedly riskier than loans to owner occupiers. The
12-month default rates on loans originated from 1999 to 2004 did not vary much be-
tween those originatedforhome purchase(as opposedto reﬁnance),and those carrying
a non-traditionalamortization schedule. However, among loans originated in 2005 and
2006, purchase loans and those with non-traditional amortization schedules defaulted
at much higher rates.
Risk Layering Figure 5 shows the default rates on loans carrying the multiple risk
factorswe discussedearlier. As showninthetoppanel,loanswithhighCLTVs andlow
FICO scores have always defaulted at higher rates than other loans. Loans with high
CLTVs used to purchase homes also had a worse track record, and saw their default
rates climb sharply over the last two years of the sample. Loans with high CLTVs and
15incompletedocumentation(panel c), however,showed the sharpest increase in defaults
relativeto other loans. This suggests that within the groupof high leverageloans, those
with incomplete documentation were particularly prone to default.
2.4 Decomposing the increase in defaults
As shown in Figure 1, the default rates on subprime loans originated in 2005 and 2006
were much higher than the rates on those originatedearlier in the sample. The previous
discussion suggests that this increase is not related to observable underwriting factors.
For example, high CLTV loans originated in 2002 defaulted at about the same rate as
other loans originated that same year. However, high CLTV loans originated in 2006
defaulted at much higher rates than other loans.
Decomposing the increase in defaults into a portion due to the mix of types of
loans originated and a portion due to house prices requires data on how all loan types
behave under a wide range of house price scenarios. If loans originated in 2006 were
truly novel, then there would be no unique decomposition between house prices and
underwriting standards. We have shown that at least some of the riskiest loan types
were already being originated (albeit in low numbers) by 2004.
To more formally test this idea, we divide the sample into two groups: an “early”
group of loans originated in the years 1999 to 2004, and a “late” group of loans origi-
nated in 2005 and 2006. We estimate default models separately on the early group and
the late group and also track changes in risk factors over these groups. We measure the
changes in risk factors between the two groups, and the changes in the coefﬁcients of
the risk model. We ﬁnd that increases in high-leverage lending and risk layering can
account for some, but by no means all, of the increase in defaults.
Table 4 provides variable means across the two groups. As shown, a much higher
fraction of loans originated in the late group defaulted: 9.28 percent as opposed to
4.60 percent. The differences between the two groups on other risk factors are in
line with the discussion earlier: FICO scores, CLTVs, the incidence of 2/28s, low
documentation, non-traditional, and purchase loans rose from the early group to the
late group.
Table 5 gives the results of a loan-level probit model estimated using data from the
early group and the late group. The table shows marginal effects and standard errors;
16the model also includes a set of state ﬁxed effects (not shown). The differences in
estimated marginal effects when using data from the early group as opposed to the late
grouparestriking. Defaults aremoresensitivein thelate groupto a varietyof otherrisk
factors, such as leverage, credit score, loan purpose, and non-traditional amortization
schedules.
The slopes in Table 5 correspond roughly to the returns in a Blinder-Oaxaca de-
composition, while the sample means correspond to the differences in endowments
between the two groups. However, because the underlying model is nonlinear, we
cannot perform the familiar Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.
As a ﬁrst step, Table 6 provides the predicted default rate in the late group using
the model estimated against data from the early group, as well as other combinations.
As shown, the early group model does not predict a signiﬁcant rise in defaults based
on the observable characteristics of the late group.
These results are consistent with the view that a factor other than underwriting
changes was primarily responsible for the increase in mortgage defaults. However,
because these results mix up changes in the distribution of risk factors between the two
groups as well as changes in the riskiness of certain characteristics, it can be useful to
consider the increase in riskiness of a typical loan after varying a few characteristics in
turn. Again, because of the non-linearity of the underlying model, we have to consider
just one set of observable characteristics and vary each characteristic in turn.
To this end, we consider a typical 2/28 originated in California with observable
characteristics set to their early-period sample means. We change each risk character-
istic in turn to its late-period sample mean, or a value suggested by the experience in
the late period.
The results are shown in Table 7. As shown, even with the worst combination of
underwritingcharacteristics,the predicteddefaultrate is abouthalf ofthe actualdefault
rateexperiencedbythisgroupofloans. Thegreatestincreasesin defaultprobabilityare
associated with higher-leverage scenarios. (Note that decreasing the CLTV to exactly
80 percent increases the default probability, for reasons we discussed earlier.)
173 What Could be Learned from the Data in 2005?
In this section, we focus on whether market participants could reasonably have esti-
mated the sensitivity of foreclosures to house price decreases. We estimate standard
competing risk, duration models using data on the performance of loans originated
through the end of 2004; presumably this is the information set available to lenders
as they were making decisions about loans originated in 2005 and 2006. We produce
out-of-sample forecasts of foreclosures, assuming the house price outcomes that the
economy has actually experienced. In Section 4 below, we address the question of
what house price expectations investors had, but here we assume market participants
had perfect foresight about future HPA.
In conducting our forecasts, we use two primary data sources. First, we use the
ABS data discussed in Section 2 above. These data are national in scope, and have
beenwidely used by mortgageanalysts to modelboth prepaymentanddefault behavior
in the subprime mortgage market, so it is not unreasonable to use these data as an
approximation of market participants’ information set. The second source of data is
publicly available, individual-level data on both housing and mortgage transactions in
the state of Massachusetts, and these data come from county-level registry of deeds
ofﬁces. While these data are not national in scope and do not have the level of detail in
terms of mortgage and borrower characteristics that the ABS data have, their historical
coverage is far superior. Speciﬁcally, the deed-registry data extend back to the early
1990s, a period in which the Northeast experienced a signiﬁcant housing downturn.
In contrast, the ABS data have very sparse coverage before 2000, as the non-agency,
subprimeMBS market did not become relevantuntil the turn of the century. Hence, for
the vast majority of the coverage of the ABS data, the economy was in the midst of a
signiﬁcant housing boom. In the next section we discuss the potential implications of
this data limitation for predicting mortgage defaults and foreclosures.
3.1 Relationship between housing equity and foreclosure
Economic theory tells us that the relationship between equity and foreclosure is highly
nonlinear. For a homeowner with positive equity in his home who needs to terminate
his mortgage a strategy of either reﬁnancing the mortgage or selling the house domi-
nates a strategy of defaulting and allowing foreclosure to occur. However, for an “un-
18derwater” homeowner, that is, one with negative equity, the optimal decision from an
economicperspectiveis sometimesto defaultandface foreclosure.10 Thus, the theoret-
ical relationship between equity and foreclosure is not linear. Rather, the sensitivity of
defaulttoequityshouldbeapproximatelyzeroforpositivevaluesofequitybutnegative
for negative values of equity. These observations imply that the relationship between
housing prices and foreclosure is very sensitive to the housing cycle. In a house price
boom, even borrowers in extreme ﬁnancial distress have more appealing options than
foreclosure, as house price gains result in positive equity. However, with house prices
falling, highly leveraged borrowers will often ﬁnd themselves in a position of negative
equity, which implies fewer options.
As a result, estimating the relationship between housing prices and foreclosures
requires, in principle, data that span a house price bust as well as a boom. Furthermore,
analysts using loan level data must account for the fact that even as foreclosures rise in
a house price bust, prepayments will also fall.
Given that the ABS data did not contain a house price bust through the end of
2004, and that, as loan level data, they could not track the experience of an individual
borroweracross manyloans, we expect(andﬁnd) that models estimated using the ABS
data only through 2004 have a harder time predicting foreclosures in 2007 and 2008
than models that include a house price bust and can track ownerships.
3.2 Forecasts Using the ABS Data
As describedin Section2, the ABS data are loan-leveldata that track mortgagesheldin
securitized pools marketed as alt-A or subprime. We restrict our attention to ﬁrst-lien,
30-year subprime mortgages originated from 2000 to 2007.
A key differencebetween the model we estimate in this section and the decomposi-
tion exercise from Section 2 is the deﬁnition of default and prepayment. The data track
the performance of these mortgages over time. Delinquency status (current, 30 days
late, 60days late, 90days or morelate, or in foreclosure)is recordedmonthlyforactive
loans. The data also differentiate between types of mortgage termination: foreclosure
or prepayment (without a notice of foreclosure). Here, we deﬁne default as a mortgage
that terminates after a notice of foreclosure was served, and prepayment as a mortgage
10See Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) for a more detailed discussion of this topic.
19that terminates without such a notice (presumably through reﬁnancing or home sale).
Thus, loans can cycle through various delinquency stages and even have a notice of
default served, but whether they are classiﬁed as happy endings (that is, prepayments)
or unhappy endings (that is, defaults) will depend on their status at termination.
To model default and prepayment behavior, we augment the ABS data with MSA-
level house price data from S&P/Case-Shiller, where available, and state-level house
price data from the Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) other-
wise. These data are used to construct mark-to-market CLTV ratios and measures of
house price volatility. Further, we augment the data with state-level unemployment
rates, monthlyoil prices, and various interest rates to capture other pressures on house-
hold balance sheets. Finally, we include zip code level data on average household in-
come, share of minority households, share of households with a high school education
or less, and the child share of the population, all from the U.S. Census.
3.2.1 Empirical model
We now use the ABS data to estimate what an analyst with perfect foresight about
house prices, interest rates, oil prices and so on would have predicted for prepayment
and foreclosures in 2005–2007, given information on mortgage performance available
at the end of 2004. We estimate a competinghazards modeloverthe 2000–2004period
and simulate mortgage defaults and prepayments over the 2005–2007 period. The
baseline hazard functions for prepayment and default are assumed to follow the PSA
guidelines, which is fairly standard in the mortgage industry.11
The factors that can affect prepayment and default include mortgage and borrower
characteristics at loan origination, such as CLTV and payment-to-income ratios, con-
tractual mortgagerate, state-level unemploymentrate, oil prices, the fully indexedcon-
tract rate (6-month LIBOR plus loan margin for adjustable-rate mortgages), the bor-
rower’s credit score, loan documentation, and occupancy status. We also include vari-
ables indicating whether the loan has any prepayment penalties, interest-only features,
piggyback mortgages, reﬁnance or purchase, and the type of property. Further, we in-
clude indicator variables to identify loans characterizedby both high leverageand poor
documentation, loans with credit scores below 600, and an interaction term between
occupancy status and cumulative HPA over the life of the mortgage. A non-occupant
11For the speciﬁc forms of the PSA guidelines, see Sherlund (2008).
20owner ought to be, all else being equal, more willing to default when it is in his narrow
ﬁnancial interest to do so, because he would not lose his primary residence.
Similarly, we include dynamically updated mortgage and borrower characteristics
that vary month-to-monthafter loan origination. Most importantly, we include an esti-
mateof the mark-to-marketCLTV; changesin housepriceswill primarilyaffectdefault
and prepayment rates through this variable. In addition, we include the current mort-
gage contract rate, house price volatility, state-level unemployment rates, oil prices,
and the fully indexed mortgage rate (that is, the index plus the margin on ARMs).
Because of the focus on payment changes, we include three indicator variables to
capture the effects of rate resets. The ﬁrst is set to unity in the three months around the
ﬁrst mortgage rate reset (one month before, the month of, and the month after reset).
The second captures whether the loan has passed its ﬁrst mortgage rate reset date. The
third is an indicator variable for changes in monthly mortgage payments of more than
5 percent from the original monthly mortgage payment to capture any potential large
payment shocks.
VariablenamesanddeﬁnitionsformodelsusingtheABS dataareshowninTable 8,
and summary statistics are shown in Table 9.
3.2.2 Estimation strategy and results
We estimate a competing-risks, proportional hazard model for six subsamples of our
data. First, the data are broken down by subprime product type: hybrid 2/28s, hybrid
3/27s, and ﬁxed-rate mortgages. Second, for each product type, estimation is carried
out separately for purchase mortgages versus reﬁnance mortgages.
Estimation results for the default hazard functions are contained in Table 10.12 The
results are similar to those reported in Sherlund (2008). As one would expect, house
prices (acting through the mark-to-market CLTV term) are extremely important. In
addition, non-occupant owners are, all else equal, more likely to default. The payment
shock and reset window variables have relatively small effects, possibly because so
many subprime borrowers defaulted in 2006 and 2007, ahead of their resets. Aggre-
gate variables such as oil prices and unemployment rates do push up defaults, but by
relatively small amounts, once we control for loan-level observables.
12For brevity, we do not display the parameter estimates for the prepayment hazard functions. They are
available upon request from the authors.
213.2.3 Simulation results
With the estimated parameters in hand, we turn to the question of how well the model
performs over the 2005–2007 period. In this exercise, we focus on the 2004 and 2005
vintages of subprime mortgages contained in the ABS data. To construct the fore-
casts, we use the estimated model parameters to calculate predicted foreclosure (and
prepayment) probabilities for each mortgage, in each month during 2005–2007. These
simulations assume perfect foresight, in that the assumed paths for house prices, un-
employmentrates, oil prices, and interest rates follow those that actually occurred. The
average default propensity each month is used to determine the number of defaults
each month, with the highest propensities defaulting ﬁrst (similarly for prepayments).
We then take the cumulative incidence of simulated defaults and compare them with
the actual incidence of defaults via cumulative default functions (that is, the percent of
original loans that default by loan age t).
The two vintages differ on many dimensions: underwriting standards, the geo-
graphic mix of loans originated, oil price shocks experienced by the loans and so on.
However, the key difference between the two is the fraction of active loans in each
vintage that experienced the house price bust that started, in some regions, as early as
2006. Loans from both vintages were tied to properties whose prices declined; how-
ever, loans from the later vintage were much more exposed. As we show, cumulative
defaultsonthe 2004vintagewere reasonable,while thoseon the 2005vintageskyrock-
eted. Thus the comparison of the 2004 and 2005 vintages provides a tough test of a
model’sability to predictdefaults. Anyresults we ﬁnd here would be largerwhencom-
paring vintages farther apart; for example, the 2003 vintage experienced much greater
and more sustained house price gains than did the 2006 vintage.
The results of this vintage simulation exercise are displayed in Figure 7. As shown,
the model overpredicts defaults among the 2004 vintage and underpredicts defaults
among the 2005 vintage. Comparing the 2005 simulation with the 2004 simulation,
the model would have predicted that, after 36 months, 9.3 percent of the 2005 vintage
wouldhavedefaulted, comparedwith 7.9percentof the 2004vintage, an increaseof 18
percent. While this is fairly signiﬁcant, it is dwarfed by the actual increase in defaults
between vintages, both because the 2005 vintage performed so poorly,and because the
2004 vintage performed better than expected.
22The cash ﬂows from a pool of mortgages are greatly affected by prepayments.
Loans that prepay (because the underlying borrower either reﬁnanced or moved) de-
liver all unpaid principal to the lender, as well as, in some cases, prepaymentpenalties.
Further, loans that prepay are not at risk of future defaults. As shown in the bottom
panel of Figure 7, prepayment rates for the two vintages fell dramatically from 2004
to 2005. The model predicted that 68 percent of loans originated in 2004 would have
prepaid by month 36, while only 57 percent of loans originated in 2005 would have
prepaid, a 16 percent drop.
Thus, the simulations predict an 18 percent increase in cumulative defaults and a
16 percent drop in cumulativeprepaymentsfor the 2005 vintage of loans relative to the
2004 vintage. These swings would have had a large impact on the cash ﬂows from the
pool of loans.
As a further explanation of the effect of house prices on the model estimated here,
we compute the conditional default and prepayment rates for the generic hybrid 2/28
mortgagewe describedin Table 7. By focusingon a particularmortgagetype, we elim-
inate the potentially confounding effects of changes in the mix of loans originated, oil
prices, interest rates, and so on between the two vintages and isolate the pure effect of
house prices. We let house prices, oil prices, unemployment rates, and so on proceed
as they did in 2004 to 2006. We then keep everything else constant, but replace house
prices with their 2006 to 2008 trajectories. The resulting conditional default and pre-
paymentrates are shown in Figure 8. As shown, forthis type of mortgageat least, there
is extremesensitivity to houseprice changes. The gapbetweenthe default probabilities
increases over time because house prices operate through the mark-to-market CLTV,
and this particular loan started with a CLTV at origination of just over 80 percent. The
gyrations in default and prepayment probabilities around month 24 are associated with
the loan’s ﬁrst mortgage rate reset.
3.3 Forecasts using the registry of deeds data
In this section, we use data from the Warren Group, which collects mortgageand hous-
ing transaction data from Massachusetts registry of deeds ofﬁces, to analyze the fore-
closure crisis in Massachusetts and to determine whether a researcher armed with this
data at the end of 2004 could have successfully predicted the rapid rise in foreclosures
23that subsequently transpired. We focus on the state of Massachusetts in this section
mostly because of data availability. The Warren Group currently collects deed-registry
data for many of the northeastern states, but their historical coverage of foreclosures is
limited to Massachusetts. However, the underlying micro-level housing and mortgage
historical data are publicly available in many U.S. states, and a motivated researcher
certainly could have obtained the data had he or she been inclined to do so before the
housingcrisis occurred. Indeed,several vendorssell such data in an easy-to-use format
for many states, albeit at signiﬁcant cost.
The deed-registry data include every residential sale deed, including foreclosure
deeds, as well as every mortgage originated in the state of Massachusetts from January
1990 through December 2007. The data contain transaction amounts and dates for
mortgages and property sales, but do not contain information on mortgage terms or
borrower characteristics. The data do contain information about the identity of the
mortgage lender, which we use in our analysis to construct indicators for mortgages
that were originated by subprime lenders.
With these data we are able to construct a panel dataset of homeowners, in which
we follow each homeowner from the date when the owner purchased the home to the
date when the owner sold the home, experienced a foreclosure, or reached the end of
our sample. We use the term “ownership experience” to refer this interval.13 Since the
data contain all residential sale transactions, we are also able to construct a collection
oftown-level,quarterly,weighted,repeat-salesindexes,usingthemethodologyofCase
and Shiller (1987).14
We use a slightly different deﬁnition of foreclosure in the deed-registry data than
in the loan-level analysis above. We use a foreclosure deed, which signiﬁes the very
end of the foreclosure process, when the property is sold at auction to a private bidder
or to the mortgage lender. This deﬁnition is not possible in the loan-level analysis,
in part because of a large degree of heterogeneity across states in foreclosure laws,
which results in signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the time span between the beginning of
the foreclosure process and its end.
13See Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007) for more details regarding the construction of the dataset.
14There are many Massachusetts towns that are too small to enable us to construct precise house price
indexes. To deal with this issue, we group the smaller towns together, based on both geographic and de-
mographic criteria. Altogether, we are able to estimate just over 100 indexes for the state’s 350 cities and
towns.
243.3.1 Comparison with the ABS Data
Thedeed-registrydata differsigniﬁcantlyfromthe ABS data. The ABS data trackindi-
vidualmortgagesovertime, while the deed-registrydata trackhomeownersin the same
residence over time. Thus, with the registry of deeds data, the researcher can follow
the same homeowner across different mortgages in the same residence and determine
the eventual outcome of the ownership experience. With the ABS data, in contrast, if
the mortgage terminated in a manner other than foreclosure, such as a reﬁnance or sale
of the property,the borrowerdrops out of the dataset and the outcomeof the ownership
experienceis unknown. Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007)arguethat analyzingown-
ership experiences rather than individual mortgages has certain advantages, depending
on the ultimate question being addressed.
Another major difference between the deed-registry data and ABS data is the pe-
riodof coverage. The deed-registrydata encompassthe housingbust of the early 1990s
in the Northeast, when there was a severe decrease in nominal house prices as well as
a signiﬁcant foreclosure crisis. Figure 9 displays the evolution of house price appre-
ciation and the foreclosure rate in Massachusetts. Foreclosure deeds began to rise
rapidly beginning in 1991 and peaked in 1992, with approximately 9,300 foreclosures
statewide. The foreclosure rate remained high through the mid-1990s, until nominal
HPA became positive in the late 1990s. The housing boom in the early 2000s is ev-
ident, with double-digit annual house price appreciation and extremely low levels of
foreclosure. We see evidence of the current foreclosure crisis at the very end of our
sample, as foreclosure deeds began rising in 2006 and by 2007 were approaching the
levels witnessed in the early 1990s.
The ﬁnal major difference between the two data sources is the coverage of the
subprime mortgage market. Since the ABS data encompass pools of non-agency,
mortgage-backedsecurities, a subprimemortgageis simply deﬁnedas a loan contained
in a pool of mortgages labeled “subprime.” In the deed-registry data, there is no infor-
mation pertaining to whether the mortgage is securitized or not, and thus, we cannot
use the same subprime deﬁnition. Instead, we use the identity of the lender in conjunc-
tion with a list of lenders who originate mainlysubprimemortgages; this is constructed
bythe Departmentof HousingandUrbanDevelopment(HUD) onan annualbasis. The
25two deﬁnitions are largely consistent with each other.15 Table 13 displays the top 10
Massachusetts subprime lenders for each year going back to 1999. The composition of
the list does change a little from year-to-year, but for the most part, the same lenders
consistently occupy a spot on the list. It is evident from the table that subprime lending
in Massachusetts peaked in 2005 and fell sharply in 2007. The increasing importance
of the subprime purchase mortgage market is also very clear from Table 13. During
the period from 1999 to 2001 the subprime mortgagemarket consisted mostly of mort-
gage reﬁnances. In 1999 and 2000, home purchases with subprime mortgagesmade up
only 25 percent of the Massachusetts subprime market, and only 30 percent in 2001.
By 2004, however, purchases made up almost 78 percent of the subprime mortgage
market, and in 2006 they made up 96 percent of the market. This is certainly evidence
supporting the idea that over time the subprime mortgage market opened up the oppor-
tunity of homeownership to many households, at least in the state of Massachusetts.
3.3.2 Empirical model
The empirical model we implement is drawnfrom Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007)
and is similar to previous models of mortgage termination, including Deng, Quigley,
and Order (2000), Deng and Gabriel (2006), and Pennington-Cross and Ho (2006). It
is a duration model similar to the one used in the above analysis of the ABS data, with
a few important differences. As in the loan-level analysis, we use a competing risks,
proportional hazard speciﬁcation, which assumes that there are baseline hazards com-
mon to all ownership experiences. However, because we are now analyzing ownership
experiences rather than individual loans, the competing risks correspond to the two
possible terminations of an ownership experience, sale and foreclosure, as opposed to
thetwo possibleterminationsofa mortgage,prepaymentandforeclosure. As discussed
above, the major difference between the two speciﬁcations comes in the treatment of
reﬁnances. In the loan-level analysis, when a borrower reﬁnances, he drops out of the
dataset, as the mortgage is terminated. However, in the ownership experience analysis,
whena borrowerreﬁnances, heremains in the data. Thus, a borrowerwhodefaults ona
reﬁnancedmortgagewill show up as a foreclosurein the deed-registrydataset, whereas
his ﬁrst mortgage will show up in the ABS data as a prepayment, and his second mort-
15See Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007)for amoredetailed comparison of different subprime mortgage
deﬁnitions. Mayer and Pence (2008) also conduct a comparison of subprime deﬁnitions, and reach similar
conclusions.
26gage may or may not show up in the data (depending on whether the mortgage was
sold into a private-label MBS), but either way, the two mortgages will not be linked
together. Thus, perforce, for the same number of eventual foreclosures, the ABS data
will show a lower apparent foreclosure rate.
Unlike mortgage terminations, ownership terminations lack a generally accepted
standard baseline hazard. Therefore, we specify both the foreclosure and sale baseline
hazards in a non-parametric manner, including a dichotomous variable for each year
after the purchase of the home. In effect, we model the baseline hazards with a set of
age dummies.16
Thelist ofexplanatoryvariablesis differentthanintheloan-levelanalysis. We have
detailed information regarding the CLTV at the time of purchase for each homeowner
in the data, and we include this information as a right-hand-side variable. We also
combine the initial CLTV with cumulative HPA since purchase, in the town where the
house is located, to construct a measure of household equity, Eit:
Eit =
(1 + CHPA
jt ) − CLTVi0
CLTVi0
, (1)
where CLTVi0 corresponds to household i’s initial CLTV, Vi0 is the purchase price of
the home, and CHPA
jt corresponds to the cumulative amount of HPA experienced in
town j from the date of house purchase through time t.17 Based on our above discus-
sion of the theory of default, the effect of an increase in equity should be signiﬁcantly
different on a borrower in a position of negative equity than on a borrower who has
positive equity in his or her home. For this reason, we assume a speciﬁcation that
allows for the effect of equity on default to change depending on the equity level of
the borrower. To do this, we specify equity as a linear spline, with six intervals: (-∞,
-10%), [-10%, 0%), [0%, 10%), [10%, 25%), and [25%, ∞).18
Since detailed mortgage and borrower characteristics are not available in the deed-
registry data, we use zip code level demographic information from the 2000 U.S. Cen-
sus, including median household income and the percentage of minority households in
16Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007) and Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) use a third-order polyno-
mial in the age of the ownership. The non-parametric speciﬁcation has the advantage of not being affected
by the non-linearities in the tails of the polynomials for old ownerships, but the results for both speciﬁcations
are very similar.
17This equity measure is somewhat crude as it does not take into account amortization, cash-out reﬁ-
nances, or home improvements. See Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) for a more detailed discussion of the
implication of these omissions on the estimates of the model.
18See Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) for a more detailed discussion of the selection of the intervals.
27the zip code, and town-level, unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). We also include the 6-month LIBOR rate in the list of explanatory variables
to capture the the effects of nominal interests rates on sale and foreclosure.19 Finally,
we include an indicator of whether the homeowner obtained ﬁnancing from a lender
on the HUD subprime lender list at the time of purchase. This variable is included
as a proxy for the different mortgage and borrower characteristics that distinguish the
subprime mortgage market from the prime mortgage market. It is important to empha-
size that we do not assign a causal interpretation to this variable. Rather we interpret
the estimated coefﬁcient as a correlation that simply tells us the relative frequency of
foreclosure for subprime purchase borrowers compared with the relative frequency for
borrowers who use a prime mortgage.
Table 11 displays summary statistics for the number of new Massachusetts owner-
ship experiences initiated and the number of sales and foreclosures, broken down by
vintage. The two housing cycles are clearly evident in this table. Almost 5 percent
of the ownerships initiated in 1990 eventually experienced a foreclosure, while fewer
than 1 percent of the vintages between 1996 and 2002 experienced a foreclosure. Even
though there is a severe right-censoring problem for the 2005 vintage of ownerships,
as of December 2007 more than 2 percent had already succumbed to foreclosure. The
housing boom of the early 2000s can also be seen in the ownership statistics, as be-
tween 80 and 100 thousand ownerships were initiated each year between 1998 and
2005, almost double the number that were initiated each year in the early 1990s and
2007.
Table 12 contains summary statistics for the explanatory variables included in the
model, also broken down by vintage. It is clear from the loan-to-value statistics that
homeownersbecamemoreleveragedonaverageoverthe periodofoursample. Median
initial CLTVs increased from 80 percent in 1990 to 90 percent in 2007. Even more
striking, the percentage of CLTVs that are greater than or equal to 90 percent almost
doubled from approximately 22.5 percent in 1990 to 41.6 percent in 2007. The table
shows both direct and indirect evidence of the increased importance of the subprime
purchase mortgage market. The last column of the table displays the percentage of
borrowers who ﬁnanced a home purchase with a subprime mortgage in Massachusetts.
19We use the 6-month LIBOR rate since the vast majority of subprime ARMs are indexed to this rate.
However, using other nominal rates such as the 10-year treasury rate does not signiﬁcantly affect the results.
28Fewer than 4 percent of new ownerships used the subprime market to purchase a home
before 2003. In 2003, the percentage increased to almost 7, and in 2005, at the peak of
the subprime market, it reached almost 15. The increased importance of the subprime
purchase market is also apparent from the zip code level income and demographic
variables. The percentage of ownerships coming from zip codes with large minority
populations (according to the 2000 Census) increased over time. Furthermore, the
number of ownerships coming from lower-income zip codes increased over time.
3.3.3 Estimation Strategy
We use the deed-registrydata to estimate the proportionalhazards model for three sep-
arate sample periods. We then use the estimates from each sample to form predicted
foreclosure probabilities for the 2004 and 2005 vintages of subprime and prime bor-
rowers and compare the predicted probabilities to the actual foreclosure outcomes of
the respective vintages. The ﬁrst sample we use is the entire span of the data, Jan-
uary 1990 to December 2007. This basically corresponds to an in-sample, goodness of
ﬁt exercise, as some of the data being used would not have been available to a fore-
caster in real time when the 2004 and 2005 vintage ownerships were initiated. This
period covers two housing downturns in the Northeast, and thus two periods when
many households found themselves in positions of negative equity, where the nominal
mortgage balance was larger than the market value of the home. From the peak of the
market in 1988 to the trough in 1992, nominal housing prices fell by more than 20
percent statewide, implying that even some of the borrowers who put 20 percent down
at the time of purchase found themselves in a position of negative equity at some point
in the early 1990s. In comparison, nominal Massachusetts housing prices fell by more
than 10 percent from their peak in 2005 through December 2007.
The second sample includes homeowners who purchased homes between January
1990 and December 2004. This is an out-of-sample exercise, as we are only using
data that were available to a researcher in 2004 to estimate the model. Thus, with this
exercise, we are asking the question of whether a mortgage modeler in 2004 could
have predicted the current foreclosure crisis using only data available at that time. This
sample does include the housing downturn of the early 1990s, and thus a signiﬁcant
numberof negativeequity observations.20 However, it includes a relatively small num-
20See Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) for a more detailed analysis of Massachusetts homeowners with
29ber of subprime ownerships. It is clear from Table 13 that the peak of the subprime
purchase mortgage market occurred in 2004 and 2005. However, the majority of the
subprime purchase observationsin the 1990–2004sample come from the 2000 to 2002
vintages, which, combined, were approximately 50 percent of the 2005 vintage. Thus,
while this sample perioddoes includea signiﬁcant housingprice decline, it does not in-
clude the peak of the subprime market. Furthermore, Section 2 provided evidence that
the underlying mortgage and borrower characteristics of the subprime market evolved
over time. Thus, the subprime purchase mortgages in the 1990–2004sample are likely
different from those originated after 2004, and this could have a signiﬁcant effect on
the ﬁt of the model.
The ﬁnal sample covers ownershipexperiences initiated between January2000 and
December 2004, and corresponds to the sample period used in the loan-level analysis
above. This was a time of extremely rapid house price appreciation, as can clearly be
seen in Figure 9. House prices increased at an annual rate of more than 10 percent in
Massachusetts during this period. Thus, the major difference between this sample and
the 1990–2004sample is the absence of a housing downturn.
3.3.4 Estimation results
The proportional hazard model is estimated at a quarterly frequency, in contrast to the
monthly frequency used in the loan-level analysis above, because of the quarterly fre-
quencyof the town-level,house price indexes. The model is estimated using maximum
likelihood. Since we are basically working with a panel dataset containing the popula-
tion of Massachusetts homeowners, the number of observations is too large to conduct
the estimation. Thus, to facilitate computation, we take three random samples of own-
erships(10percentofthe 1990–2007sample, 10percentofthe 1990–2004sample, and
25 percent of the 2000–2004 sample). Finally, we truncate ownerships that last longer
than 8 years, for two reasons. First, because there are relatively few of these long own-
erships, the estimates of the baseline hazard are imprecise. Second, because of missing
information regarding mortgage equity withdrawal, the equity measure becomes more
biased as the length of the ownership experience increases.21
Figure 10 displays the estimates of both the foreclosure and the sale baseline haz-
negative equity in the early 1990s.
21The estimation results are not very sensitive to this 8-year cutoff. Assuming a 7-year or 9-year cutoff
produces almost identical results.
30ards. The foreclosure baseline is hump-shaped, and reaches a peak between the fourth
and ﬁfth year of the ownershipexperience. The sale baseline rises sharply over the ﬁrst
three years of the ownership, then ﬂattens until the seventh year, when it continues to
rise. In Table 14 we display the parameter estimates. The ﬁrst panel contains estimates
for the full sample (1990–2007); the second panel contains estimates for the period
1990–2004;and the third panel displays estimates for the period 2000–2004.22 For the
most part, the signs of the estimates are intuitive and consistent with economic theory.
Higher interest and unemploymentrates tend to raise foreclosures, although the coefﬁ-
cient estimate associated with the LIBOR rate switches signs in the 1990–2004sample.
Homeowners who ﬁnance their home purchase from subprime lenders are more likely
to experiencea foreclosurethan those who use primelenders. Borrowerswho purchase
a condominium or a multi-family property are more likely to experience a foreclosure
than borrowers who purchase a single-family home, in both the full sample and the
1990–2004 samples. This likely reﬂects the fact that the Massachusetts condominium
market was hit especially hard by the housing downturn in the early 1990s, and the
fact that many of the economically depressed cities in Massachusetts are characterized
by housing stocks that are disproportionately made up of multi-family properties. In
the 2000–2004 sample, homeowners in condominiums are actually less likely to ex-
perience a foreclosure. Finally, ownerships located in zip codes with relatively larger
minority populations and lower median income levels are more likely to experience a
foreclosure.
The quantitative implications of the parameter estimates are displayed in Table 16.
The table displays the effect of a change in selected variables (one standard deviation
for continuous variables and zero-one for dummies) on the probability of foreclosure.
For example, the ﬁrst panel shows that a homeowner who purchased his house with
a subprime mortgage is approximately 7.3 times as likely to default, all else being
equal, than a homeowner who purchased with a prime mortgage, and 1.1 times as
likely to experience a foreclosure if the unemployment rate is one standard deviation
above average. The functional form of the proportional hazard model implies that the
effect of several different changes on the hazard is multiplicative. For example, the
combined effect of a subprime purchase ownership and one-standard deviation higher
22For brevity we do not display the parameter estimates for the sale hazard. They are available upon
request from the authors.
31unemployment is 7.3 × 1.1 = 8.0.
There are some interesting differences across the different sample periods, most
notably associated with the estimate of the subprime purchase indicator. In the full
sample period, subprime purchase ownerships are more than 7 times as likely to ex-
perience foreclosure, but in the earlier sample period (1990–2004), they are only 3.4
times as likely to default. Based on the analysis from Section 2, this likely reﬂects
differences in mortgage and borrower characteristics between the two samples. For
example, increases in debt-to-income ratios and low documentation loans, as well as
increases in mortgages with discrete payment jumps, have characterized the subprime
market over the past few years. This has likely had a lot to do with the deterioration
in the performance of the subprime purchase market. Of course, there are other pos-
sible explanations such as a deterioration in unobservable lender-speciﬁc underwriting
characteristics. Another possibility is a higher sensitivity to declining house prices
relative to prime purchase ownerships. Although the subprime market existed in the
early 1990s, most of the activity came in the form of reﬁnances (as evidenced by Fig-
ure 13). Thus, not many subprime purchase ownerships from the 1990–2004 sample
actually experienced a signiﬁcant decline in house prices, whereas the vast majority of
subprime ownerships took place in 2004 and 2005, and many of these were exposed
to large price declines. The performance of subprime purchases is better in the 2000–
2004 sample than in the full sample but worse than in the 1990–2004 sample, as they
are approximately 5.5 times as likely to experience foreclosure.
Since housing equity Eit is estimated with a spline, the estimates are not shown in
Table 16. Instead, we graph the predicted foreclosure hazard as a function of equity
relative to a baseline subprime purchase ownership in Figure 11. The covariates for
the baseline ownership have have been set to their full sample averages. Each panel
corresponds to a different sample period. There were virtually no equity values below
zero in the 2000–2004 sample to estimate the spline, so instead we were forced to use
a single parameter.
The takeaway from the ﬁgure is that increases in Eit have a large and negative ef-
fect on foreclosures for the range of equity values between -50 and 25 percent of the
purchase mortgage. For ownerships with nominal equity values above 25 percent, fur-
ther increases in equity have a much smaller effect on the foreclosure hazard. This is
consistent with the intuition presented above. Homeowners with positive equity who
32are either in ﬁnancial distress or need to move for another reason are not likely to
default, since they are better off selling their homes instead. Thus, if a homeowner
already has a signiﬁcant amount of positive equity, additional equity is likely to matter
little in the default decision. However, when one takes into account the potential trans-
actions costs involved in selling a property, such as the real estate broker commission
(usually 6 percent of the sale price) as well as moving expenses, the equity threshold
at which borrowers will default may be greater than zero. Therefore, the apparent kink
in the foreclosure hazard at 25 percent equity is not necessarily inconsistent with the
discussion above.
The estimated non-linear relationship is similar for the full sample and the 1990–
2004 sample. The scale is higher and the non-linearity is more pronounced in the full
sample, as that sample includes the recent foreclosure crisis. But, perhaps the most
surprising observation from Figure 11 is the shape of the predicted hazard from the
2000–2004sample(lowerleft panel). While thepredictedhazardis necessarilysmooth
becauseofthe singleparameterthat governsthe relationship,it has a verysimilar shape
and scale to the other samples. This is surprising because the sensitivity of foreclosure
to equity is being estimated with only positive equity variation in this sample. On the
face of things, the ﬁgure seems to suggest that one could estimate the sensitivity using
positive variation in equity and then extrapolate to negative equity values and obtain
ﬁndings that are similar to those obtained using a sample with housing price declines.
This is, of course, in part, a result of the non-linear functional form of the proportional
hazard model, and it would be impossible in a linear framework (for example, a linear
probability model). The implications of this in terms of forecasting ability is discussed
below.
3.3.5 Simulation results
With the estimated parameters in hand, we turn to the question of how well the model
performs, both in-sample and out-of-sample. In this exercise, we focus on the 2004
and 2005 vintages of subprime purchase borrowers. The choice of these vintages is
motivated both by performance and by data availability. The summary statistics in Ta-
ble 11 suggest that the 2004 vintage was the ﬁrst to suffer elevated foreclosure rates in
the currenthousingcrisis, and the 2005vintage is experiencingeven higherforeclosure
33rates. Unfortunately, we do not have enough data at this time to conduct a thorough
analysis of the 2006 or 2007 vintages.
To construct the forecasts, we use the estimated model parameters to calculate pre-
dicted foreclosure probabilities for each individual ownership in the vintages of inter-
est between the time that the vintage was initiated and 2007:Q4. We then take the
individual predicted probabilities and aggregate them to obtain cumulative foreclosure
probabilities for each respective vintage, and we compare the predicted foreclosure
probabilities to the probabilities that actually occurred.23 The results for the subprime
purchase vintages are displayed in Figures 12 and 13.
The model consistently overpredicts foreclosures for the 2004 subprime vintage
(top left panel in Figure 12) in the full sample, as approximately 9.2 percent of the
vintage had succumbed to foreclosure as of 2007:Q4, while the model predicts 11.2
percent. For the out-of-sample forecasts, the model underpredicts Massachusetts fore-
closures, but there are signiﬁcant differencesbetween the two differentsample periods.
The model estimated using data from 1990–2004 is only able to account for a little
over half of the foreclosures experienced by the 2004 vintage, while the model esti-
mated using data from 2000–2004 accounts for almost 85 percent of the foreclosures.
The reason for the better ﬁt can likely be attributed to the larger coefﬁcient estimate
associated with the subprime mortgage indicator variable for the 2000–2004 sample
compared with the 1990–2004 (see Table 14). In Table 13 we see similar patterns
for the 2005 subprime vintage, although the in-sample forecast slightly underpredicts
cumulative foreclosures, and the out-of-sample forecasts are markedly worse for both
sample periods compared with the 2004 subprime vintage forecasts. The 1990–2004
out-of-sample forecast accounts for only one-third of the foreclosures experienced by
the 2005 subprime vintage, while the 2000–2004does better, accountingfor more than
60 percent of the foreclosures. However, this is not as good as the 2004 vintage fore-
cast.
To summarize, the model, estimated using data from the 2000–2004vintages, does
very well in its 2005–2007 out-of-sample foreclosure predictions for the 2004 vin-
tage of subprime purchase borrowers, accounting for approximately 85 percent of cu-
mulative foreclosures in 2007:Q4. The model does not perform quite as well for the
2005vintage, as it accounts for only 63 percent of cumulativeforeclosuresin 2007:Q4.
23See Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007) for more details.
34There are signiﬁcant differences between the performance of the model estimated us-
ing data from different sample periods. The model estimated using the 2000–2004
sample performs much better than model estimated using data from the 1990–2004
sample period. This is despite the fact that the latter sample period includes a decline
in housing prices, while the former does not. Based on observations from Figure 11,
the proportional hazards model is able to estimate the nonlinear relationship between
equityand foreclosure,even whenthere are no negativeequity observationsin the data.
Thus, the primary explanation for the difference in the out-of-sample forecasts is the
different coefﬁcient estimates associated with the HUD subprime purchase indicator.
4 What Did the Participants Say in 2005 and 2006?
In this section, we attempt to understand why the investment community did not an-
ticipate the subprime mortgage crisis. We do this by looking at written records from
market participants in the period from 2004 to 2006.
These records include analyst reports from investment banks, publications by rat-
ing agencies, and discussions in the media. We have chosen not to identify the ﬁve
major banks (J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, UBS, and Lehman Brothers)
individually, but rather by alias (Bank A, Bank B, etc.)24 Five basic themes emerge in
this section. First, the subprime market was viewed by market insiders as a great suc-
cess story in 2005. Second, subprime mortgages were viewed, in some sense correctly,
as lower risk than prime mortgages because of their more stable prepayment behavior.
Third, analysts used fairly sophisticated tools, but were hampered by the absence of
episodes of falling prices in their data. Fourth, many analysts anticipated the crisis
in a qualitative way, laying out in various ways a roadmap of what could happen, but
they never ﬂeshed out the quantitative implications. Finally, analysts were remarkably
optimistic about HPA.
Figure 14 provides a timeline for this discussion. The top part shows HPA us-
ing the Case-Shiller 20-city composite index. In the ﬁrst half of 2005, HPA for the
nation as a whole was positive but in the single digits and so well below the record
pace set in 2004 and 2005. By the end of the third quarter, HPA was negative, al-
though, given the reporting lag in the Case-Shiller numbers, market participants would
24Researchers interested in verifying the sources should contact the authors.
35not have had this datapoint until the end of the fourth quarter. The bottom part of
the ﬁgure shows the prices of the ABX-HE 06-01-AAA and ABX-HE 06-01-BBB
indexes which measure the cost of insuring, respectively, AAA-rated and BBB-rated
subprime-mortgage-backedsecurities issued in the secondhalf of 2005, andcontaining
mortgages originated throughout 2005. One can arguably date the subprime crisis to
the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 when the cost of insuring the BBB-rated securities, which had
not changed throughoutall of 2006, started to rise. The broader ﬁnancial market crisis,
which started in August, coincides with another spike in the BBB index and the ﬁrst
signs of trouble in the AAA index. The purpose of this section is to try and understand
why market participants did not appreciate the impending crisis, as evidenced by the
behavior of the ABX indexes in 2006.
4.1 General state of the subprime market
In2005,marketparticipantsviewedthe subprimemarketas a success storyalongmany
dimensions. Borrowers had become much more mainstream. Bank A analysts referred
to the subprime borrower as “Classic Middle America,” writing:
The subprime borrower today has a monthly income above the national
median and a long tenure in his job and profession. His home is a three-
bedroom, two bathroom, typical American home, valued at the national
median home price. Past credit problems are the main reason why the
subprime borrower is ineligible for a prime loan.25
Analysts noted that the credit quality of the typical subprime borrower had improved.
The average FICO score of a subprime borrower had risen consistently from 2000 to
2005.26 But other aspects got better too.
...collateral credit quality has been improving since 2000. FICO scores
and loan balances increased signiﬁcantly implying a mainstreaming of the
subprimeborrower. The deeplysubprimeborrowersof the late 1990s have
been replaced by the average American homeowner...27
Lenders had improved as well. Participants drew a distinction between the seedy
subprimelenders of the mid-late 1990s and the new generationof lenders that they saw
25Bank A, October 10, 2005.
26ibid and Bank E, February 15, 2005.
27Bank A, October 10, 2005.
36as well-capitalized and well-run.
The issuer and servicer landscape in the HEL market has changed dramat-
ically since the liquidity crisis of 1998. Large mortgage lenders or units of
diversiﬁed ﬁnancial services companies have replaced the small specialty
ﬁnance companies of the 1990s.28
Lenders, analysts believed, could weather a storm:
...today’s subprime issuer/servicers are in much better shape in terms of
ﬁnancial strength. If and when the market hits some kind of turbulence,
today’s servicers are in a better position to ride out the adverse market
conditions.29
Another dimension along which the market had improved was the use of data. Many
market participants were using loan-level data and modern statistical techniques. Bank
A analysts expressed a widely held view when they wrote:
An increase in the sophisticationof all market participants— fromlenders
to the underwriters to the rating agencies to investors. All of these par-
ticipants now have access to quantitative models that analyze extensive
historical data to estimate credit and prepayment rates.30
Contemporary observers placed a fair amount of faith in the role of credit scoring
in improving the market. FICO scores did appear to have signiﬁcant predictive power
for credit problems. In particular, statistical evidence showed that FICO scores, when
combined with LTV, could “explain a large part of the credit variation between deals
and groups of subprime loans.”31 The use of risk-based pricing made origination de-
cisions more consistent and transparent across originators, and thus resulted in more
predictable performance for investors.
We believe that this more consistent and sophisticated underwriting is
showingupasmore consistentperformancefor investors. An investorbuy-
ing a subprime home equity security backed by 2001 and 2002 (or later
28Bank A, October 10, 2005. Here and elsewhere, “HEL” is used by market participants to refer to “home
equity loan”, the typical market participant term for either a junior lien to a prime borrower, or senior lien
to a subprime borrower. Although the two loan types appear quite different, from a ﬁnancial engineering
standpoint both prepaid relatively quickly but were not that sensitive to prevailing interest rates on prime
ﬁrst-lien mortgages.
29Bank E, January 31, 2006.
30Bank A, October 10, 2005.
31Bank E, February 15, 2005.
37vintage) loans is much more likely to get the advertised performance than
buying a deal from earlier years. [Italics in the original] 32
One has to remember that the use of credit scores such as the FICO model emerged
as a crucial part of residential mortgage credit decisions only in the mid-1990s.33 And
as late as 1998, one observer points out, FICO scores were absent for more than 29
percent of the mortgages in their sample, but by 2002, this number had fallen to 6
percent.34
Other things had also made the market more mature. One reason given for the rise
in average FICO scores was that “the proliferation of state and municipal predatory
lending laws has made it more onerous to fund very low credit loans.”35
Finally, marketparticipants’experiencewith ratingagenciesthroughmid-2006had
been exceptionally good. Rating agencies had what appeared to be sophisticated mod-
els of credit performanceusingloan-leveldata and state of the art statistical techniques.
S&P, for example, used a database, “which compiles the loan level and performance
characteristics for every RMBS (residential mortgage-backedsecurity) transaction that
we have rated since 1998.”36 Market participants appeared to put a lot of weight on the
historical stability of HEL credit ratings.37 And indeed, through2004,the recordof the
major rating agencies was solid. Table 15 shows S&P’s record from their ﬁrst RMBS
rating in 1978 to the end of 2007 and illustrates that the probability of a downgrade
was quite small and far smaller than the probability of an upgrade.
4.2 Prepayment risk
Investors allocated appreciable fractions of their portfolios to the subprime market be-
cause, in one key sense, it was considered less risky than the prime market. The issue
was prepayments,and the evidenceshowed that subprimeborrowersprepaidmuchless
efﬁciently than prime borrowers,meaning that they did not immediately exploit advan-
tageous changesin interest rates to reﬁnanceinto lower rate loans. Thus, the sensitivity
of the income stream from a pool of subprime loans to interest rate changes was lower
thanthe sensitivity of a poolof primemortgages. Accordingto classical ﬁnance theory,
32Bank E, February 15, 2005.
33Mester, 1997
34Bank E, February 15, 2005.
35Bank A, Dec. 16, 2003.
36“A More Stressful Test Of A Housing Market Decline On U.S. RMBS,” S&P, May 15, 2006.
37Bank A, October 20, 2005.
38one could even argue that subprime loans were less risky in an absolute sense. While
subprime borrowers had a lot of idiosyncratic risk, as evidenced by their problem-
atic credit histories, such borrower-speciﬁc shocks can be diversiﬁed away in a large
enough pool. In addition, the absolute level of prepayment (rather than its sensitivity
to interest rate changes) of subprimeloans is quite high, reﬂecting the fact that borrow-
ers with such loans either resolve their personal ﬁnancial difﬁculties and graduate into
a prime loan or encounter further problems and reﬁnance again into a new subprime
loan, terminating the previous loan. However, this prepayment was also thought to be
effectivelyuncorrelatedacross borrowersand not tightlyrelated to changesin the inter-
est rate environment. Mortgage pricing revolved around the sensitivity of reﬁnancing
to interest rates; subprime loans appeared to be a useful class of assets whose cash ﬂow
was not particularly correlated with interest rate shocks. Thus, Bank A analysts wrote,
in 2005:
[Subprime]prepaymentsaremorestablethanprepaymentsonprimemort-
gages adding appeal to [subprime] securities.38
A simple way to see the differencebetween prepaymentbehaviorof primeand sub-
primeborrowersis to lookat variationin a commonlyused mortgageindustrymeasure,
the so-called constant prepayment rate, or CPR, which is the annualized probability of
prepayment. Accordingto Bank A analysts, the minimumCPR for subprimeﬁxed-rate
mortgages was 18 percent, and for ARMs it was 29 percent. By contrast, for Fannie
Mae mortgages, the minimums were 7 and 15 percent, respectively. As mentioned
above, this was attributed to the fact that even in a stable interest rate environment,
subprime borrowers will reﬁnance in response to household-level shocks. At the other
end, the maximum CPRs for subprime ﬁxed and ARM borrowers are 41 and 54 per-
cent, respectively, compared with 58 and 53, respectively, for Fannie Mae borrowers.
The lower CPR for subprime reﬂects, at least partly, the prevalence of prepayment
penalties. More than 66 percent of subprime borrowers face prepayment penalties.
Historically, the prepaymentpenalty period often lasted ﬁve years, but in most cases, it
had shortened to two years for ARMs, and three for ﬁxed-rate mortgages, by 2005.
38Bank A, October 10, 2005.
394.3 Data
Correctly modeling (and thus pricing) prepayment and default risk requires good un-
derlyingdata, givingmarket participants everyincentiveto acquire data on loan perfor-
mance. As mentioned above, analysts at every ﬁrm we looked at, including the rating
agencies, had access to loan-level data. One major problem, however, was that these
data, for the most part, did not include any examples of sustained price declines. The
fact that the Trends database only dates back to 1998 is typical. Bank A’s RAMP-RS,
for example, dates back to 1998. And the problems were particularly severe for sub-
prime loans, since there essentially were none before 1998. Furthermore, to add to the
problems, analysts believed that the experience of pre- and post-2001 subprime loans
were not necessarily comparable. In addition, in one sample, analysts identiﬁed a ma-
jor change in servicing, pointing in particular to a new rule that managers needed to
havefour-yearcollegedegrees, as explainingsigniﬁcant differencesin defaultbehavior
before and after 2001.
Analysts recognized that their modeling was constrained by lack of data on the
performance of loans through house price downturns. Some analysts simply focused
on the cases for which they had data — high and low positive HPA experiences. In one
Bank A report,the highest current LTV bin examinedwas “> 70 percent.”39 The worst
case examined in a Bank E analyst report in the fall of 2005 was 0–5 percent HPA.40
But, in truth, most analysts appear to have been aware that the lack of examples of
negative HPA was not ideal. Bank A analysts wrote in December of 2003 that,
Because of the strong HPA over the past ﬁve years, high LTV buckets of
loans thin out fast, limiting the history.41
And they knew this was a problem. In June of 2005, an analyst at Bank A wrote:
We do not project losses with home appreciation below 2.5% because the
dataset on which the model was ﬁtted contains no meaningful home price
declines and few loans with LTVs in the high 90s. Therefore, model pro-
jections for scenarios that take LTVs well above 100% are subject to sig-
niﬁcant uncertainty. 42
39Bank A, March 17, 2004.
40Bank E, December 13, 2005.
41Bank A, December 13, 2005.
42Bank A, June 3, 2005.
40However, eventually, some analysts overcame these problems. In a debate that
we discuss in more detail below, S&P and Bank A analysts considered scenarios with
signiﬁcant declines in house prices. An S&P report in September of 2005 considered a
scenario in which house prices fell on the coasts by 30 percent and in the interior of the
countryby 10 percent.43 Bank A analysts also examined the same scenario, illustrating
that by December they were able to overcome the lack of meaningful price declines
identiﬁed in June.44
4.4 Role of HPA
Market participants clearly understood that HPA played a central role in the the dy-
namics of foreclosures. They identiﬁed at least three key facts about the interaction
between HPA and foreclosures. First, HPA provided an “exit strategy” for troubled
borrowers. Second, analysts identiﬁed a close relationship between reﬁnance activity
and prepayment speeds for untroubled borrowers, which also reduced losses. Third,
they knew high HPA meant that even when borrowers did default, losses would be
small. Finally, they understood that the exceptionally small losses on recent vintage
subprime loans were due to exceptionally high HPA and that a decline in HPA would
lead to higher losses.
The role of HPA in preventingdefaults was well understood. Essentially, high HPA
meant borrowers were very unlikely to have negative equity, and this, in turn, implied
that defaultingwas never optimal for a borrowerwho could proﬁtablysell the property.
Inaddition,highHPA meantthat lenderswere willingto reﬁnance. The followingview
was widely echoed in the industry:45
Because of strong HPA, many delinquent borrowers have been able to sell
their house and avoid foreclosure. Also, aggressive competition among
lenders has meant that some delinquent borrowers have been able to reﬁ-
nance their loans on more favorable terms instead of defaulting.46
The “double-trigger”theory of default was the prevailing wisdom:
43Simulated Housing Market Decline Reveals Defaults Only in Lowest-Rated US RMBS Transactions,
Standard and Poor’s, September 13, 2005.
44Bank A, December 2, 2005.
45See also Bank E, December 13, 2005.
46Bank A, October 20, 2005.
41Borrowers who are faced with an adverse economic event — loss of job,
death,divorceorlargemedicalexpense— andwhohavelittle equityinthe
property are more likely to default than borrowers who have large equity
stakes.47
Participants also identiﬁedthe interactionbetween HPA and prepaymentas another
way that HPA suppressed losses. As a Bank A analyst explained in the fall of 2005:
Prepayments on subprime hybrids are strongly dependent on equity build-
up and therefore on HPA. Slower prepayments extend the time a loan is
outstanding and exposed to default risk.48
Quantitatively, the analyst claimed that a fall in HPA from 15 percent to -5 percent
would reduce CPR, the annualized prepayment rate of the loan pool, by 29 percentage
points.
Analysts seem to have understood both that high HPA of recent years accounted
for the exceptionally strong performanceof recent vintages, and that lower HPA repre-
sented a major risk going forward. A Bank E analyst wrote in the fall of 2005:
Double-digit HPA is the major factor supportingwhy recent vintage mort-
gages have produced lower delinquencies and much lower losses.49
An analyst at Bank C wrote:
...the boom in housing translated to a build-up of equity that beneﬁted
subprimeborrowers,allowing them to reﬁnanceand/oravoid default. This
has been directly reﬂected in the above average performance of the 2003
and 2004 HEL ABS vintages.50
And in a different report, another Bank E analyst argued that investors did understand
its importance:
Ifanyonequestionedwhetherhousingappreciationhasjoinedinterestrates
as a key variable in mortgage analysis, attendance at a recent CPR/CDR
conferencewouldhaveremovedalldoubts. Virtuallyeveryspeaker,whether
47Bank A, December 2, 2005.
48Bank A, December 2, 2005.
49Bank E, December 13, 2005.
50Bank C, April 11, 2006.
42talking about prepayments or mortgage credit, focuses on the impact of
house prices.51
Analysts did attempt to measure the quantitative implications of slower HPA. In
August of 2005, analysts at Bank B evaluated the performance of 2005 deals in ﬁve
HPA scenarios. In the “meltdown”scenario, whichinvolved-5 percentHPA forthe life
of the deal, they concluded that cumulative losses on the deals would be 17.1 percent
of the original principal balance. Because the “meltdown” is roughly what actually
happened, we can compare their forecast with actual outcomes. Implied cumulative
losses for the deals in the ABX-06-01, which are deals made in 2005, are between 17
and 22 percent, depending on the assumptions. 52
The lack of examples of price declines in their data did not prevent analysts from
appreciatingthe importanceof HPA, consistent with the results of the previoussection.
In an April 2006 report, analysts at Bank C pointed out that the cross-section of MSAs
illustrated the importance of HPA:
The areas with the hottest real estate markets experienced low single-digit
delinquencies, minimal LTD losses, [and] low loss severity, ... a sharp
contrast to performance in areas at the low end of HPA growth.53
Greeley, Colorado, had 6 percent HPA since origination and 20 percent delinquency.
At the other extreme was Bakersﬁeld, California, with 87 percent HPA and 2 percent
delinquency. Their estimated relationships between delinquency rates and loss rates
and cumulative HPA since origination using the 2003 vintage, are plotted in the top
and bottom panels, respectively, of Figure 15. Even in their sample, there was a dra-
matic difference in performance between low and high levels of cumulative HPA. The
ﬁgure suggests that it was possible to use variation across regions in positive levels of
cumulative HPA to extrapolate to situations with negative levels of cumulative HPA.
For example, if we used the tables to forecast delinquencies in May of 2008 with a 20
percent fall in house prices (roughly what happened), we would get a 35 percent delin-
quency rate and 4 percent cumulative loss rate. The actual numbers for the 2006-1
ABX are 3.37 percent losses and a 37 percent delinquency rate.
In some ways, most interestingly, some analysts seem to have understood that the
51Bank E, November 1, 2005.
52See Bank C, August 21, 2008 and Bank B, 9/2/2008.
53Bank C, April 11, 2006.
43problems might extend beyond higher losses on some subprime ABS. In the fall of
2005, Bank A analysts mapped out almost exactly what happened in the summer of
2007, but the analysis is brief and not the centerpiece of their report. They started
by noting, “As of November 2004, only three AAA-rated RMBS classes have ever
defaulted...” And, indeed, to that point, almost no AAA rated RMBS had defaulted.
But, they understood that even without such defaults, problems could be severe:
Eventhoughhighlyratedcertiﬁcates areunlikelytosufferlosses, poorcol-
lateral or structural performancemay subject them to a ratings downgrade.
For mark-to-marketportfolios the negative rating event may be disastrous,
leading to large spread widening and trading losses. Further down the
credit curve, the rating downgrades become slightly more common, and
need to be considered in addition to the default risk.54
The only exception to the claim that analysts understood the magnitude of df/dp
comes from the rating agencies. As a rating agency, S&P was forced to focus on the
worst possible scenario rather than the most likely one. And their worst-case scenario
is remarkably close to what actually happened. In September of 2005, they considered
the following:
- a 30 percent house price decline over two years for 50 percent of the pool
- a 10 percent house price decline over two years for 50 percent of the pool.
- an economy that was“slowing but not recessionary”
- a cut in Fed Funds rate to 2.75 percent
- a strong recovery in 2008.
In this scenario, they concludedthat cumulative losses would be 5.82 percent. Interest-
ingly, their predictions of losses for the ﬁrst three years are around 3.43 percent, which
is in line with both the estimates from Bank C’s estimated relationship (Figure 15) and
the data from deals in the 2006-1 ABX.55 Their problem was in forecasting the major
losses that would occur later. As a Bank C analyst recently said, “The steepest part of
the loss ramp lies straight ahead.”56
S&P concluded that none of the investment grade tranches of RMBSs would be
affected at all — that is, no defaults or downgrades would occur. In May of 2006,
54Bank A, October 10, 2005.
55“Simulated Housing Market Decline Reveals Defaults Only In Lowest-Rated US RMBS Transactions,”
S&P, September 13, 2005.
56Bank C, Septmeber 2, 2008.
44they updated their scenario to include a minor recession in 2007, and they eliminated
both the rate cut and the strong recovery. They still saw no downgrades of any A-rated
bonds or most of the BBB-rated bonds. They did expect widespread defaults, but this
was, after all, a scenario they considered “highly unlikely.” Although S&P does not
provide detailed information on their model of credit losses, it is impossible to avoid
concludingthat their estimates ofdf/dp were way off. Theyobviouslyappreciatedthat
df/dp was not zero, but their estimates were clearly too small.
The problems with the S&P analysis did not go unnoticed. Bank A analysts dis-
agreed sharply with S&P:
Our loss projections in the S&P scenario are vastly different from S&P’s
projections with the same scenario. For 2005 subprime loans, S&P pre-
dicts lifetime cumulative losses of 5.8 percent, which is less than half our
number... We believethat S&P numbersgreatly understatethe risk of HPA
declines.57
The irony of this is that both S&P and Bank A ended up quite bullish, but for different
reasons. S&P apparently believed that df/dp was low, whereas most analysts appear
to have believed that dp/dt was unlikely to fall substantially.
4.5 House price appreciation
Virtuallyeveryoneagreedin2005thattherecordHPApaceofrecentyearswasunlikely
to be repeated. However, many believed that price growth would simply revert to its
long run average, not that price levels or valuations would. At worst, some predicted a
prolonged period of subpar nominal price growth.
A Bank A report in December of 2005 expressed the prevailing view on house
prices that, “A slowdown of HPA seems assured.” The question was by how much. In
that report, the Bank A analysts stated:
...the risk of a national decline in home prices appears remote. The annual
HPA has never been negative in the United States going back at least to
1992.
The authors acknowledge that there had been regional falls,
57Bank A, December 12, 2005.
45In each one of these regional corrections, the decline of home prices coin-
cided with a deep regional recession.
The conclusion that prices were unlikely to fall follows from the fact that “few
economists predicta near-term recession in the U.S.”58 An analyst at Bank D described
the future as a scenario in which house prices would “rust but not bust.”59
Bank B analysts actually assigned probabilities to various house price outcomes.60
They considered ﬁve scenarios:
Name Scenario Probability
(1) Aggressive 11% HPA over the life of the pool 15%
(2) [No name] 8% HPA over the life of the pool 15%
(3) Base HPA slows to 5% by year-end 2005 50%
(4) Pessimistic 0% HPA for the next 3 years, 5% thereafter 15%
(5) Meltdown -5% for the next 3 years, 5% thereafter 5%
Over the relevant period, HPA actually came in a little below the -5 percent of the
meltdown scenario, according to the Case-Shiller index. Reinforcing the idea that they
viewed the meltdown as implausible, the analysts devoted no time to discussing the
consequences of the meltdown scenario even though it is clear from tables in the paper
that it would lead to widespread defaults and downgrades,even among the highly rated
investment grade subprime ABS.
The belief that such a widespread and steep decline in house prices could not occur
persisted even long after prices began to fall. The titles of a series of analyst reports
entitled “HPA Update” from Bank C tell the story:61
Date of Data from Title
12/8/06 10/06 “More widespread declines with early stabilization signs”
1/10/07 11/06 “Continuing declines with stronger stabilization signs”
2/6/07 12/06 “Tentative stabilization in HPA”
3/12/07 1/07 “Continued stabilization in HPA”
9/20/07 7/07 “Near bottom on HPA”
11/2/07 9/07 “UGLY! Double digit declines in August and September”
58Bank A, December 2, 2005.
59Bank D, November 27, 2006.
60Bank B, August 15, 2005.
61Bank C, “HPA Update,” dates as noted.
46By 2008, Bank C analysts had swung to the opposite extreme; their position in May
was, “We expect another 15 percent drop in home prices over the next 12 months.”62
However, the belief that a national decline was unlikely was not shared universally.
Bank E analysts took issue with the views expressed above, writing that:
Those bullish on the housing market often cite the historic data... to show
that only in three quarters since 1975 have U.S. home prices (on a na-
tional basis) turned negative, and for no individual year have prices turned
negative.63
But they went on to point out, correctly, that those claims are only true in nominal
terms and that in real terms house prices had fallen on many occasions.
4.6 What they anticipated
With the exception of the S&P analysts, it seems everyoneunderstood that a major fall
in HPA would lead to a dramatic increase in problems in the subprime market. Thus,
understanding df/dp does not appear to have been a problem. In a sense, this more or
less implies that dp/dt was the problem, and the evidence conﬁrms it. Most analysts
simply thought that a 20 percent nationwide fall in prices was impossible, let alone the
even larger falls we have seen in certain regions — Arizona, California, Florida and
Nevada — which accounted for a disproportionate share of subprime lending.
One can argue that the basic pieces of the story were all there. Analysts seem to
have understood that house prices could fall. They seem to have understood that HPA
played a central role in the performanceof subprime loans. Some seem, in many cases,
to have understood how large that role was. Others seem to have understood that even
downgrades of RMBSs would have serious consequences for the market. However,
none of the analyst reports we found seem to have put the whole story together in 2005
or 2006.
5 Conclusion
The subprime mortgage crisis leads one naturally to wonder how large and sophisti-
cated market participants badly underestimated the credit risk of heterodox mortgages.
62Bank C, May 16, 2008.
63Bank E, November 1, 2005.
47As we showed in Section 2, subprime lending only incrementally added risk fea-
tures,andtheunderlyingleverageofloanswas, atleast insomedatasources,somewhat
obscure. Thus, rather than plunging into uncharted waters, investors may have felt in-
creasing comfort with each successive round of weaker underwriting standards.
The buoyant house price environment that prevailed through mid-2006 certainly
held down losses on subprime mortgages. Nonetheless, as we showed in Section 3,
even with just a few years of data on subprime mortgage performance, containing al-
most no episodes of outright price declines, loan-level models reﬂect the sensitivity of
defaults to house prices. Loss models based on these data should have warned of a sig-
niﬁcantincreaseinlosses, albeitsmallerthantheactualincrease. Ofcourse,makingthe
effort to acquire property records from a region afﬂicted by a major price drop, such as
Massachusetts in the early 1990s, would have allowed market participantssigniﬁcantly
more precise estimates of the likely increase in foreclosures following a drop in house
prices. Nonetheless, evenoff-the-shelfdataand models, fromthe pointofview of early
2005, would have predicted sharp increases in subprime defaults following a drop in
house prices. However, these models are sensitive to speciﬁcation and assumptions
about the future, so by choosingthe speciﬁcation that gave the lowest default rates, one
could have maintained a sanguine outlook for subprime mortgage performance.
In the end, one has to wonderwhethermarketparticipantsunderestimatedthe prob-
ability of a house price collapse or misunderstoodthe consequences of such a collapse.
Thus, in Section 4, we describe our reading of the mountain of research reports, media
commentary, and other written records left by market participants of the era. Investors
were focused on issues such as small differences in prepayment speeds that, in hind-
sight, appear of secondaryimportanceto the credit losses stemming from a house price
downturn. When they did consider scenarios with house price declines, market partic-
ipants as a whole appear to have correctly identiﬁed the subsequent losses. However,
such scenarios were labeled as “meltdowns” and ascribed very low probabilities. At
the time, there was a lively debate over the future course of house prices, with dis-
agreement over valuation metrics and even the correct index with which to measure
house prices. Thus, at the start of 2005, it was genuinely possible to be convinced that
nominal U.S. house prices would not fall substantially.
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50Table 1: Subprime Share of U.S. Mortgage Market. Table gives measures of the penetration of subprime mortgages in the U.S., 2004 to 2008:Q1.
Outstandings are taken at from the MBA’s national delinquency surveys for Q4 of the indicated years. Originations are taken from data collected under
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). In this dataset, a subprime loan corresponds to a mortgage classiﬁed as “high cost” (roughly speaking,
carrying APRs 3 percent above the yield on the 30 year Treasury bond). The high cost fraction was unusually low in 2004 because of the conﬁguration of
the yield curve and operational issues. First liens, not weighted by loan value.
Subprime loans as a % of total
Period Outstanding Loans New originations
2004 12.3 11.5 15.5
2005 13.4 24.6 25.7
2006 13.7 25.3 31.0
2007 12.7 14.0 21.7
2008:Q2 12.2 –n.a.–
Table 2: Joint Distribution of CLTV and Second Liens. Joint distribution of the combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) at origination and the indicator
variable for the presence of a second lien.
Second Lien No Yes
Mean CLTV 79.92% 98.84%
Fraction of loans with CLTV...
< 80 0.35 0.01
= 80 0.18 0.00
> 80 & < 90 0.18 0.01
= 90 0.15 0.01
> 90 & < 100 0.08 0.16
≥ 100 0.05 0.80Table 3: The Effect of Leverage. Top panel shows marginal probabilities from a probit model where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether the
loan had defaulted by its 12th month of life. Bottom panel coefﬁcients from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the loan’s initial contract
interest rate. Results are from a 10 percent random sample of the ABS data. Standard errors are not shown.
(1) Probability of Default within 12 months of origination
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Mean
Default Rate 0.0655
Marginal Effects
CLTV 0.00219 0.00223 82.6929
CLTV2/100 -0.00103 -0.00103 70.3912
CLTV= 80 0.00961 0.01036 0.1572
80 <CLTV< 90 0.00014 -0.00302 0.1556
CLTV= 90 0.00724 -0.00041 0.1286
90 <CLTV< 100 0.00368 -0.00734 0.0968
CLTV≥ 100 0.00901 -0.00740 0.1620
Second lien recorded 0.05262 0.04500 0.1452
Initial contract rate 0.01940 0.02355 8.2037
Origination date effects? N Y
State effects? N Y
Observations 679,518 679,518
(2) Initial Contract Rate




CLTV= 80 -.0127 -.0817
80 <CLTV< 90 .0430 .1106
CLTV= 90 .1037 .2266
90 <CLTV< 100 .0202 .3258
CLTV≥ 100 .0158 .3777
Second lien recorded -.8522 -.6491
Origination date effects? N Y
State effects? N Y
Observations 707,823 707,823Table 4: Sample Means. Table gives sample means and standard deviations of selected underwriting variables from the ABS data. The “early” group
comprises loans originated from 1999 to 2004; the “late” group comprises loans originated in 2005 and 2006.
All loans Early Late
Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev
Outcomes 12 months after origination
Defaulted 0.0657 0.2478 0.0460 0.2095 0.0928 0.2901
Reﬁnanced 0.1622 0.3686 0.1596 0.3663 0.1657 0.3718
Characteristics
Contract rate 8.2059 1.5882 8.3763 1.7639 7.9721 1.2726
Margin 4.4539 2.9418 4.2815 3.1135 4.6904 2.6704
FICO score 610 60 607 61 615 58
CLTV 83 14 81 14 85 15
Mortgage types
Fixed-rate 0.2814 0.4497 0.3230 0.4676 0.2243 0.4171
2/28 0.5854 0.4927 0.5340 0.4988 0.6558 0.4751
3/27 0.1333 0.3399 0.1430 0.3501 0.1199 0.3248
Documentation type
Complete 0.6828 0.4654 0.7062 0.4555 0.6507 0.4768
No doc 0.0031 0.0558 0.0038 0.0612 0.0023 0.0475
Low doc 0.3071 0.4613 0.2782 0.4481 0.3468 0.4760
Other
Non-traditional 0.1604 0.3669 0.0693 0.2540 0.2853 0.4515
Non-occ. owner 0.0657 0.2478 0.0651 0.2468 0.0666 0.2493
Reﬁnance 0.6700 0.4702 0.7095 0.4540 0.6158 0.4864
Second lien 0.1459 0.3530 0.0750 0.2634 0.2432 0.4290
PP Pen 0.7355 0.4411 0.7400 0.4387 0.7293 0.4443
Observations 3,532,525 2,043,354 1,489,171Table 5: Results of Default Model. Marginal effects and standard errors from a probit model of default after 12 months on the indicated variables.
Regressions also include a complete set of state ﬁxed effects.
Early Late
Variable ∂F/∂x σ ∂F/∂x σ
Contract rate 0.0097 0.0001 0.0328 0.0002
Margin 0.0013 0.0001 0.0016 0.0003
2/28 0.0036 0.0009 0.0158 0.0016
3/27 0.0030 0.0010 0.0105 0.0020
CLTV 0.0007 0.0001 0.0037 0.0002
CLTV2/100 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0018 0.0002
CLTV= 80 0.0035 0.0005 0.0225 0.0012
80 <CLTV< 90 -0.0017 0.0006 0.0119 0.0014
90 ≤CLTV< 100 -0.0014 0.0008 0.0154 0.0022
CLTV≥ 100 -0.0000 0.0015 0.0229 0.0029
Second lien 0.0165 0.0008 0.0391 0.0009
FICO -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000
FICO< 620 -0.0015 0.0008 0.0202 0.0015
FICO= 620 -0.0012 0.0016 0.0194 0.0031
620 <FICO< 680 -0.0040 0.0006 0.0110 0.0010
Hi CLTV× low FICO -0.0004 0.0006 0.0013 0.0010
Hi CLTV× Purchase 0.0053 0.0006 -0.0143 0.0010
Hi CLTV× low doc 0.0059 0.0007 0.0129 0.0010
Reﬁ -0.0064 0.0004 -0.0223 0.0009
Non-owner occ. 0.0113 0.0006 0.0158 0.0010
Low doc 0.0127 0.0004 0.0160 0.0007
No doc 0.0107 0.0027 0.0293 0.0059
PP Pen 0.0012 0.0003 0.0087 0.0006
Pmt to inc. rat 1 0.0003 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000
Pmt to inc. rat 2 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0001
Ratio 1 missing 0.0131 0.0007 0.0330 0.0014
Ratio 2 missing 0.0240 0.0006 0.0273 0.0017
Retail source 0.0036 0.0005 -0.0204 0.0012
Wholesale source 0.0050 0.0004 0.0044 0.0009
Broker source 0.0011 0.0011 -0.0055 0.0019
Non-trad. 0.0043 0.0005 0.0218 0.0006
Observations 2,043,354 1,489,171
Pseudo R2 0.0929 0.0971
Table 6: Predicted Defaults Rates by Model. The ﬁrst row gives model-predicted average default rates given observables in the early period from a model
estimated against the early period (ﬁrst column) and the later late period (second column). The second row does the same, but for observables from the
late period. The subsequent columns repeat the exercise, but break out each origination year separately.
Coeff. from model











2006 0.0531 0.1155Table 7: The Effect of Incremental Underwriting Changes. Table gives a variety of alternative risk characteristics and their associated 12-month default
probabilities from the model estimated using data from the early period. In all cases, the loan is a 2/28 with an initial rate of 8.22 percent, a margin of 6.26
percent, originated in California and with other variables set to their sample means. The ﬁnal column gives the actual 12-month default rate experienced
by these types of loans in the late period.
Variable Base CLTV CLTV FICO Low doc Non-trad Purchase CLTV > 99 CLTV > 99 CLTV > 99 Actual
= 80 > 99 = 573 Low Doc FICO = 573 Purchase
CLTV 81.3 80 99.23 81.3 81.3 81.3 81.3 99.23 99.23 99.23 81.3
Second lien No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes No
FICO 600 600 600 573 600 600 600 600 573 600 600
Reﬁ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Low doc No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
Non-trad No No No No No Yes No No No No No
b PEarly 0.0196 0.0228 0.0376 0.0247 0.0288 0.0196 0.0241 0.0617 0.0376 0.0522 0.1136Table 8: ABS Data Variable Names and Deﬁnitions
Variable Description
cash Cash-out reﬁnancing indicator
cltvnow Current mark-to-market combined LTV (percent)
cltvorig Combined LTV at origination (percent)
doc Full loan documentation indicator
educ Zip code level share of high-school (or less) educated persons
ﬁcoorig Credit (FICO) score at origination
frmnow Current 30-year FRM rate (percent)
frmorig 30-year FRM rate at origination (percent)
hhincome Zip code level average household income (dollars)
hpvol House price volatility (percent, 2-year standard deviation HPA)
indnow Current fully indexed rate (6-month LIBOR plus margin, percent)
indorig Fully indexed rate at origination (percent)
invhpa Cumulative house price appreciation if nonowner=1 (percent)
kids Zip code level child share of population
lngwind Mortgage past rate reset period indicator
loﬁco Credit score < 600 indicator
loqual Risk layering of leverage and low doc (CLTV¿95 and doc=0 at orig)
mratenow Current mortgage interest rate (percent)
mrateorig Contract rate at origination (percent)
nonowner Not owner-occupied indicator
oil Change in oil prices since loan origination (percent)
origamt Loan amount at origination (dollars)
piggyback Second liens recorded at origination indicator
pmi Private mortgage insurance indicator
pmt Current monthly payment >5% larger than original indicator
ppnow Prepayment penalty still in effect indicator
pporig Prepayment penalty at origination indicator
proptype Single-family home indicator
pti Payment-to-incomeratio at origination (percent)
race Zip code level minority population share
reﬁ Reﬁnancing (including cash-out) indicator
rstwind Mortgages in reset period indicator
unempnow Change in unemployment rate since origination (percent)
unorig State-level unemployment rate at origination (percent)
Table 9: ABS Data Sample Averages, 2000–2004
2000–2004 2004 2005
Origination Active Default Prepay Origination Origination
cash 0.57 0.57 0.52 0.58 0.58 0.54
cltvnow 81.91 73.59 66.10 0.00 83.76 84.90
cltvorig 81.91 83.15 81.61 79.81 83.76 84.90
doc 0.70 0.69 0.74 0.70 0.66 0.64
dti 38.99 38.87 39.09 39.18 39.41 40.07
educ 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.37 0.37
ﬁcoorig 610 616 582 605 616 619
frmnow 6.28 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.88 5.85
frmorig 6.28 6.03 6.89 6.62 5.88 5.85
hhincome 43,110 42,421 39,116 44,945 43,007 42,379
hpvol 3.38 4.15 3.20 4.78 3.91 4.57
hpvorig 3.38 3.41 2.52 3.46 3.91 4.57
indnow 8.52 9.06 9.51 9.12 7.90 9.81
indorig 8.52 8.06 10.06 9.05 7.90 9.81
invhpa 1.63 1.14 2.31 2.38 0.55 0.16
kids 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
lngwind 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.00
loqual 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.12
mratenow 8.22 7.73 9.95 8.81 7.32 7.56
mrateorig 8.22 7.72 9.95 8.82 7.32 7.56
nonowner 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.08
oil 0.00 26.96 54.47 53.35 0.00 0.00
origamt 118,523 119,569 89,096 121,636 136,192 148,320
piggyback 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.23
pmi 0.27 0.24 0.35 0.31 0.19 0.23
pmt 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
ppnow 0.73 0.67 0.36 0.38 0.73 0.72
pporig 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.72
proptype 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.87 0.86
race 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31
reﬁ 0.68 0.67 0.64 0.70 0.65 0.60
rstwind 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00
unempnow 0.00 -4.50 13.47 2.95 0.00 0.00
unorig 5.58 5.69 5.06 5.48 5.63 5.06
No. obs. 3,654,683 2,195,233 183,586 1,275,864 1,267,866 1,794,953Table 10: ABS Data Default Hazard Function Estimates, 2000–2004
Subprime 2/28 Subprime 3/27 Subprime FRM
Purch Reﬁ Purch Reﬁ Purch Reﬁ
constant 7.519∗ 4.143∗ 5.819∗ -0.842 7.826∗ 3.213∗
cltvorig -0.032∗ 0.002 -0.010 -0.008 -0.027∗ -0.011∗
mrateorig 0.325∗ 0.273∗ -0.786 -0.067 -0.255 0.159
pporig 0.033 0.115 -0.329 0.056 0.157 0.439∗
unorig -0.023 -0.040∗ -0.028 -0.043 -0.080 -0.091∗
indorig -0.270∗ -0.358∗ -0.136∗ -0.145∗ —- —-
ﬁcoorig -4.388∗ -4.881∗ -4.084∗ -2.321∗ -4.874∗ -4.386∗
doc -0.185∗ -0.378∗ -0.012 -0.272∗ -0.271∗ -0.194∗
nonowner 0.557∗ 0.281∗ 0.883∗ 0.351∗ 0.540∗ 0.431∗
piggyback 0.287∗ 0.286∗ 0.300∗ 0.287 0.133 -0.329
cash —- 0.016 —- 0.087 —- -0.110∗
proptype 0.143∗ 0.031 0.167 0.060 -0.128 -0.025
loqual -0.039 -0.112 0.031 -0.331 -0.215 0.561∗
invhpa -0.032∗ -0.012∗ -0.064∗ -0.015 -0.030∗ -0.011∗
origamt 0.298∗ 0.115∗ 0.489∗ 0.234∗ 0.480∗ 0.148∗
kids 0.317 0.249 1.304 -0.635 0.521 -0.695
race 0.690∗ -0.302∗ 0.182 -0.082 0.593∗ -0.324∗
educ -0.439 -0.125 -1.401∗ -0.376 -0.075 0.227
cltvnow 0.030∗ 0.008∗ 0.019∗ 0.025∗ 0.036∗ 0.028∗
mratenow -0.031 0.044 1.071∗ 0.376 0.468 0.109
ppnow -0.156∗ -0.056 0.148 -0.084 -0.141 -0.320∗
rstwind -0.239∗ -0.150∗ 0.100 0.143 —- —-
lngwind 0.139 0.059 0.683∗ -0.027 —- —-
hpvol -0.034∗ -0.038∗ -0.046∗ -0.029 -0.064∗ -0.037∗
unempnow 0.007∗ 0.009∗ 0.005∗ 0.004 0.000 -0.003∗
indnow 0.291∗ 0.369∗ 0.217∗ 0.234∗ —- —-
hhincome -0.575∗ -0.256∗ -0.758∗ -0.223 -0.872∗ -0.222∗
oil 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.006∗ 0.005∗
pmt 0.525∗ -0.149 1.478∗ 0.707∗ 1.144* 0.393
pmi 0.075∗ 0.174∗ 0.212∗ 0.074 0.311∗ 0.160∗
frmorig -0.105∗ 0.105∗ -0.310∗ -0.025 -0.209∗ -0.198∗
frmnow -0.124∗ -0.179∗ 0.054 0.109 0.181∗ 0.113∗
dti 0.005∗ 0.009∗ 0.009∗ 0.007∗ -0.002 0.006∗
loﬁco -0.151∗ -0.056 -0.256∗ 0.056 -0.085 0.128∗
ln L -140,135 -297,352 -30,071 -50,544 -36,574 -170,927
No. obs. 1,095,227 2,015,104 241,511 373,976 324,431 1,582,146
Table 11: Deed-registry data Percentage of Foreclosures and Sales by Vintage
# ownerships foreclosure % sale %
1990 46,723 4.79 29.63
1991 48,609 2.18 31.56
1992 57,414 1.33 32.10
1993 63,494 1.17 32.63
1994 69,870 1.07 33.81
1995 65,193 1.05 35.79
1996 74,129 0.87 37.30
1997 79,205 0.77 38.32
1998 89,123 0.59 39.09
1999 90,350 0.74 39.75
2000 84,965 0.90 39.74
2001 83,184 0.82 36.09
2002 86,648 0.88 30.70
2003 88,824 1.09 23.12
2004 97,390 1.75 15.60
2005 95,177 2.19 8.49
2006 80,203 1.34 4.00
2007 48,911 0.07 1.36Table 12: Deed-registry data Summary Statistics by Vintage
Initial cltv minority % (zip code) Median income (zip code) condo % multi-family % subprime purchase %
median % ≥ 90 median mean median mean mean mean mean
1990 0.800 22.54 8.52 14.59 54,897 57,584 19.41 10.21 0.00
1991 0.800 24.20 7.98 13.39 56,563 59,784 17.08 7.69 0.00
1992 0.800 26.05 7.76 13.00 56,879 60,217 15.02 7.89 0.01
1993 0.849 30.47 7.77 13.33 56,605 59,714 14.77 8.86 0.10
1994 0.872 32.90 7.98 13.79 55,880 58,848 14.87 10.15 0.39
1995 0.874 35.29 8.26 14.49 55,364 58,089 16.01 10.97 0.43
1996 0.871 35.22 8.25 14.22 55,364 58,076 16.98 10.41 0.91
1997 0.850 33.87 8.26 14.39 55,358 57,864 17.64 10.59 1.92
1998 0.850 33.41 8.25 14.20 54,897 57,394 18.90 10.40 2.56
1999 0.850 33.28 8.63 14.88 54,677 56,742 20.15 11.11 2.43
2000 0.824 31.67 8.65 14.96 54,402 56,344 21.55 11.17 2.43
2001 0.850 34.42 8.63 14.98 53,294 55,524 21.34 11.46 2.89
2002 0.820 32.32 9.14 15.25 53,357 55,672 22.63 11.14 3.88
2003 0.850 34.47 9.14 15.51 53,122 55,337 22.68 11.20 6.86
2004 0.866 35.68 9.66 16.42 52,561 55,017 24.48 11.85 9.99
2005 0.899 39.40 10.19 17.07 52,030 54,231 28.29 11.83 14.81
2006 0.900 41.65 9.92 17.10 51,906 54,326 28.09 10.80 12.96
2007 0.900 41.62 9.92 16.64 53,122 55,917 29.95 8.54 3.95Table 13: Massachusetts Subprime Lender Originations 1999–2007
Lender # total # purchase Lender # total # purchase Lender # total # purchase
originations originations originations originations originations originations
2007 2004 2001
Summit 1,601 1,584 Option One 3,767 3,129 Option One 2,660 1,111
Option One 360 358 New Century 2,991 2,507 New Century 1,263 323
Equiﬁrst 195 195 Freemont 2,895 2,461 Ameriquest 1,984 296
New Century 149 149 Argent 2,200 2,068 Citiﬁnancial Services 1,040 140
Freemont 108 107 Fieldstone 1,131 1,023 Freemont 748 317
Accredited Home 75 74 Accredited Home 1,014 820 Household Financial Corp. 548 61
Argent 73 73 Mortgage Lender Net 972 536 Wells Fargo Finance 467 43
Aegis 54 53 Nation One 946 927 Argent 457 66
Wilmington Finance 46 43 WMC 888 586 First Franklin 367 251
Nation One 44 44 Long Beach 812 685 Meritage 349 333
Total 3,021 2,956 Total 23,761 18,481 Total 15,308 4,595
2006 2003 2000
Mortgage Lender Net 2,489 2,310 Option One 3,157 2222 Option One 2,773 1,000
Summit 2,021 1,948 New Century 1,694 1053 Ameriquest 2,047 287
Freemont 2,016 1,973 Freemont 1,519 1089 Citiﬁnancial Services 1,275 112
New Century 1,978 1,942 Ameriquest 1,288 436 New Century 1,251 336
WMC 1,888 1,860 First Franklin 922 917 Freemont 773 267
Option One 1,616 1,552 Argent 836 536 Household Financial Corp. 761 55
Accredited Home 1,006 986 Mortgage Lender Net 802 381 Long Beach 470 289
Argent 640 626 Accredited Home 636 428 First Franklin 464 407
Southstar 632 624 Fieldstone 585 430 Mortgage Lender Net 464 36
Equiﬁrst 598 564 Citiﬁnancial Services 459 70 Argent 437 48
Total 18,211 17,489 Total 17,988 11,062 Total 15,870 3,982
2005 2002 1999
Option One 4,409 4,152 Option One 2,822 1502 Option One 2,828 1013
Freemont 3,927 3,675 Ameriquest 1,713 526 Ameriquest 1,929 229
New Century 3,125 2,906 New Century 1,261 443 Citiﬁnancial Services 1,303 108
Argent 2,253 2,195 Freemont 1,071 595 New Century 1,273 340
WMC 1,846 1,681 First Franklin 657 622 Freemont 738 233
Accredited Home 1,601 1,498 Citiﬁnancial Services 656 97 Household Financial Corp. 728 47
Long Beach 1,599 1,551 Mortgage Lender Net 627 170 Wells Fargo Finance 478 26
Summit 1,588 1,440 Argent 606 166 Mortgage Lender Net 452 44
Mortgage Lender Net 1,494 1,211 Wells Fargo Finance 411 27 Long Beach 413 202
Nation One 969 959 Accredited Home 358 184 Argent 410 38
Total 28,464 26,128 Total 15,296 6,459 Total 16,161 3,852Table 14: Estimates of Foreclosure Hazard Using deed-registry data
1990–2007Sample 1990–2004Sample 2000–2004 Sample
Coef Std. Err. Coef Std. Err. Coef Std. Err.
initial LTV -0.27 0.19 -1.40 0.22 -0.82 1.71
LIBOR (6-month) 1.96e−02 1.39e−02 -3.09e−02 1.52e−02 0.18 0.11
unemployment rate 4.74e−02 6.00e−03 5.03e−02 6.14e−03 7.70e−02 5.24e−03
% minority (2000 zip-code) 9.23e−03 1.03e−03 1.09e−02 1.20e−03 6.30e−03 4.31e−03
median income (2000 zip-code) -1.60e−05 1.82e−06 -1.71e−05 2.05e−06 -6.90e−05 1.03e−05
condo indicator 0.33 0.05 0.44 0.05 -1.19 0.35
multi-family property indicator 0.54 0.05 0.54 0.06 -0.24 0.20
subprime purchase indicator 1.99 0.06 1.21 0.19 1.70 0.21
# observations 3,005,137 2,365,999 813,802
Table 15: The outcomes of S&P RMBS ratings, 1978–2004. From “Rating Transitions 2004: U.S. RMBS Stellar Performance Continues to Set Records,”
Standard and Poor’s, January 21, 2005.
# rated Upgrade Downgrade Default
AAA 6,137 – 0.5 0.07
AA 5,702 22.4 3.6 0.5
A 4,325 16.2 1.3 0.7
BBB 4,826 11.1 2.0 1.2
BB 2,042 17.9 2.3 1.4
B 1,687 14.1 4.1 3.1
Table 16: Standardized Elasticities from Estimates Using deed-registry data
1990–2007 1990–2004 2000–2004
(+/-) std. dev. factor change factor change factor change
in hazard in hazard in hazard
Unemployment rate (+) 2.06 1.10 1.12 1.17
% minority (2000 zip-code) (+) 19.58 1.20 1.24 1.13
Median income (2000 zip-code) (−) $24,493 1.49 1.53 5.60
Multi-family indicator . 1.72 1.72 0.79
Condo indicator . 1.39 1.55 0.30
Subprime purchase indicator . 7.32 3.35 5.47Figure 1: Twelve-Month Default Rate on Subprime Mortgages

























NOTE. Figure shows the percent of loans that default within 12 months of origination, by month of origination, from Jan.
1999 to Dec. 2006, from the ABS data.
Figure 2: FICO Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Borrowers




















NOTE. Figure shows distribution of subprime loans by credit score at origination, by month, from January 1999 to Decem-
ber 2007, from the ABS data.Figure 3: Evolving Underwriting Characteristics on Subprime Mortgages. Source: LP ABS data.
% Low Documentation Leverage




































Other Subprime Mortgage Risk Factors Risk Layering







































High CLTV + Low FICO
High CLTV + Low/no Doc
High CLTV + PurchaseFigure 4: Default Characteristics on Subprime Mortgages by Month of Origination. Source: LP ABS data.
























































CLTV≥ 90 percent (or second lien recorded)
CLTV<90 percent (and no second lien recorded)

























































Loan Purpose: All other




























Traditional amortization scheduleFigure 5: Twelve-Month Default Rates on Loans with Risk Layering
(a) FICO Scores



























High LTV and low FICO score
All other loans
(b) Loan Purpose: Purchase vs. Reﬁ



























High LTV and loan purpose=purchase
All other loans
(c) Documentation Status



























High LTV and low/no doc
All other loans
NOTE. Figure shows the percentage of loans that default within 12 months of origination conditional on three risk factors,
by month of origination, from Jan. 1999 to Dec. 2006, from the ABS data. Panel (a) gives results by owner occupancy,
panel (b) gives results by loan purpose, and panel (c) gives results for loans with non-traditional amortization schedules.Figure 6: Effect of CLTV on Default and Interest Rate
(a) Default Probabilities































(b) Initial Contract Interest Rates










































NOTE. Figure shows graphically the results of the models estimated in Table 3.Figure 7: Vintage Simulations Using ABS Data
(a) Defaults






























































NOTE. Figures show actual and simulated cumulative defaults (top panel) and prepayments (bottom panel) for the 2004
and 2005 vintages of loans. The simulations assume perfect foresight about house prices, interest rates, oil prices, and
unemployment rates.Figure 8: Effect of House Prices on a Generic 2/28 in the ABS Data
(a) Defaults








































NOTE. Figures show the probability in month t of default (top panel) and prepayments, conditional on surviving to month
t − 1 for a generic hybrid 2/28 subprime mortgage as described in Table 7; the dynamic variables follow their 2004 to
2006 trajectories, except for house prices, which are set either to their 2004 to 2006 trajectories or to their 2006 to 2008
































































ւ Cyclical Peak, Q3, 1988
The foreclosure rate is calculated at a quarterly frequency. The numerator is the total number of foreclosures
in MA in a given quarter and is obtained directly from the Warren Group data. The denominator is the
number of residential parcels in a given year, where a parcel is deﬁned as a real unit of property used for
the assessment of property taxes, and a typical parcel consists of a plot of land deﬁned by a deed and any
buildings located on the land. Information on parcel counts is obtained from the Massachusetts Department
of Revenue. Finally, house prices are calculated using the Case-Shiller weighted, repeat-sales methodology,
using data from the Warren Group.Figure 10: Estimate of Baseline Hazards

























































































SaleFigure 11: Estimated Effect of Equity on Foreclosure





































































































Equity (%)Figure 12: 2004 Subprime Purchase Vintage Simulations
























































































































































































































































































Cumulative HPA in %
ւIn-Sample
ւOut-of-Sample
Cumulative Losses after two years































Cumulative HPA in %
ւIn-Sample
ւOut-of-Sample
74